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ABSTRACT 
State practice is an important element of international law, both 
as a key component of customary international law and as a crucial 
tool for interpreting treaties.  In this Article, the Author seeks to 
show that there are important flaws in the International Court of 
Justice’s application of state practice.  The Court has relied on 
actual practice to determine the content of customary rules 
surprisingly rarely, instead frequently basing its conclusions 
instead on non-binding actions by international bodies or on its 
own decisions.  In some cases, it has reached decisions clearly 
inconsistent with significant and relevant state practice; in others, it 
has proclaimed doctrines unsupported by state behavior as rules of 
law.  The Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of the 
practice of parties to treaties in cases presenting interpretation 
questions, sometimes proclaiming the necessity of relying on such 
practice while on other occasions failing even to acknowledge the 
existence of practice contrary to the result it reaches.  This behavior 
by the Court is problematic for a number of reasons and, 
paradoxically, makes the Court itself an impediment to wider 
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Among international lawyers, there is no dispute that 
determining the precise content of customary international law 
(“CIL”) is difficult, and that treaty terms are not always easy to 
construe.  In such circumstances, there would be obvious utility in 
establishing an impartial tribunal composed of experts in 
international law who can resolve inter-state disputes by sorting 
out the complexities of CIL and applying their expertise to 
questions of treaty interpretation.  Of course, states have attempted 
to do just that, starting with the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ”) and replacing that court with the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ” or the Court) after World War II.  While a 
number of specialized international tribunals have been created in 
recent decades, the ICJ remains the only international tribunal 
whose jurisdiction is not limited to a specific subject matter. 
Assessments of the Court vary.  There is, to be sure, much 
reason to see the ICJ as important and useful.  The Charter of the 
United Nations declares the ICJ to be “the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations.”1  The task of electing the judges of the 
court is seen as a matter of sufficient moment to require the 
participation of both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council of the United Nations.2  Scholarly assessment is generally 
favorable.  For instance, according to the Third Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law, “to the extent that decisions of 
international tribunals adjudicate questions of international law, 
they are persuasive evidence of what the law is.  The judgments 
and opinions of the International Court of Justice are accorded 
great weight.”3  One can find similar statements in the writings of 
highly regarded scholars of international law.  As an example, 
Judge Cassese has observed: 
[G]iven the rudimentary character of international law, and 
the lack of both a central lawmaking body and a central 
judicial institution endowed with compulsory jurisdiction, 
in practice many decisions of the most authoritative courts 
(in particular the ICJ) are bound to have crucial importance 
in establishing the existence of customary rules, or in 
 
1 U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 2 U.N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 4–12, 59 Stat. 
1031, U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. 
 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§ 103 cmt. b (1987). 
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defining their scope and content, or in promoting the 
evolution of new concepts.4 
Further, a casebook widely used in American law schools 
states, “the decisions of the International Court of Justice are, on 
the whole, regarded by international lawyers as highly persuasive 
authority of existing international law.”5 
Despite the foregoing, it is also true that particular ICJ 
decisions have been strongly criticized.  For example, the Court’s 
decision in the merits phase of Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)6 drew highly critical comments 
from several commentators;7 its decisions in Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
United States)8 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall9 
also received a fair amount of negative reaction.10  Generally, 
 
 4 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2001). 
 5 LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134–35 
(4th ed. 2001). 
 6 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118–119 
(June 27) (holding that the United States’ unsolicited collective self-defense efforts 
in Nicaragua violated the customary international law established through the 
U.N. Charter). 
 7 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 101, 102 (1987) (arguing that the ICJ’s reliance on the U.N. Charter rather 
than state practice as the source of customary international law in Nicar. v. U.S. 
misunderstood the purpose of customary law); Thomas M. Franck, Some 
Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 
116, 116–120 (1987) (disagreeing with the ICJ’s holding in Nicar. v. U.S. because of 
the court’s weighting of evidence, interpretation of customary international law, 
and interpretation of the substantive principle of collective self-defense); John 
Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and 
Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137–43 (1987) (arguing that the ICJ proceeded 
beyond interpreting the U.N. Charter in Nicar. v. U.S. and weakened the 
international right of self-defense as a result). 
 8  Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 165, 196–198 (Nov. 6) (holding that 
the U.S. destruction of Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf was not a valid 
use of self-defense, since it was not objectively shown that self-defense was 
necessary). 
 9 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201 (July 9) 
(holding that Israel’s construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
was contrary to international law). 
 10 For reaction to the Oil Platforms case, see William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense 
and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 298–306 (2004) (arguing that 
the ICJ’s ruling on self-defense in Oil Platforms was not only unnecessary to decide 
the particular dispute, but also could be read to unduly limit the right of self-
defense); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence 
and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 52, 57–61 (2005) (arguing that the 
ICJ’s holding in Oil Platforms limited the right of self-defense to situations where 
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however, critics have focused on the results in individual cases, 
rather than on evaluating the Court’s overall performance. 
To understand why this lack of more general analyses of the 
Court is important, it is crucial to realize that the authority 
expressly vested in the Court is rather limited.  Under its Statute, 
the ICJ has jurisdiction in contentious cases only when the states 
involved in the dispute have consented to that jurisdiction.11  
Further, the Statute provides that the ICJ’s decisions are binding 
only “between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”12  
Also, no international instrument provides for the enforcement of 
the ICJ’s judgments except Article 94 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which leaves to the discretion of the Security Council the 
issue of whether to enforce any particular judgment.13  These 
provisions, taken together, make it impossible for the ICJ to control 
the interpretation of international law in the way, for example, that 
the Supreme Court of the United States can control interpretation 
of the Constitution.  Or, more precisely, these provisions indicate 
the refusal of the states which established the ICJ to confer upon it 
a competence to make determinations of the content of 
 
the threat was already too severe and hindered states’ ability to protect civilians 
through action that is valid under international law as self-defense).  For reaction 
to the Wall case, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory 
Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005) (arguing that the 
ICJ’s holding in the Wall Case lacked extensive factual analysis or sufficiently 
deep reasoning); Michla Pomerance, The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the 
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 32–42 
(2005) (arguing that the ICJ’s decision in the Wall Case was unduly influenced by 
political considerations). 
 11 This consent may be ad hoc.  I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 1.  
Alternatively, this consent may take the form of a provision in a treaty providing 
that disputes involving that treaty shall be resolved by the ICJ—an advance 
consent, in other words.  See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005, 645–49 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining the role of 
compromissory clauses in bilateral and multilateral treaties).  In addition, the 
Statute permits states to declare their consent generally to the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction in cases wherein the other parties have similarly consented.  I.C.J. 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2.  Relatively few states have accepted 
jurisdiction under this provision—sixty-five states currently have made 
declarations under Article 36, Paragraph 2, not including four of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United 
States) or such important states as Brazil, South Africa, or Venezuela.  
International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the 
Court as Compulsory, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5 
&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
 12 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 59. 
 13 U.N. Charter, art. 94. 
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international law which, as a practical matter, can be made binding 
on the world. 
In these circumstances, the Court’s ability to resolve individual 
disputes and its capacity to clarify the content of international law 
depend on states’ willingness to bring cases to it, which in part 
depends on the perceived quality of its work.  Even if it lacks the 
authority to make generally binding legal determinations, states 
can and presumably will accept its view of the law if they perceive 
the Court as an institution upon which they can rely for a careful 
resolution of legal questions.  Similar considerations, one would 
hope, would apply to scholars seeking to determine whether the 
Court is a reliable expositor of international law.  In this 
connection, a distinction drawn by Professor Movsesian is helpful.  
He distinguishes between judicial decisions having what he calls 
“disposition value”—decisions which lower courts are obliged to 
accept as stating the law because of the place of the deciding court 
in the relevant judicial hierarchy—and decisions having 
“information value”—decisions which another court is not legally 
obliged to follow, but which are nonetheless influential because of 
the expertise of the court and the quality of its analysis.14  Thus, the 
ICJ’s expertise in matters of international law could be so great as 
to make its opinions influential with national courts, governments, 
and scholars, regardless of their formally binding character.  On 
the other hand, if analysis gives reason to question the quality of 
the Court’s work, states will be on notice of the risks of taking 
cases to the Court, and scholars will learn to treat its opinions with 
caution. 
This Article attempts such an analysis of one aspect of the 
Court’s jurisprudence:  its treatment of state practice.  The 
significance of state practice in international law is difficult to 
overstate.  It is accepted as a component of CIL.15  Furthermore, the 
practice of states’ parties to a particular treaty is understood to be 
an important element in determining the treaty’s meaning.16  
 
 14 See Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 
88–89 (2007) (describing the domestic effects of international judgments in 
countries that utilize a “dualist” approach). 
 15 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 38. 
 16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, para. 3(b), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Treaties Convention]. 
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Indeed, the Court itself has stated that the use of parties’ practice to 
interpret treaties is an element of CIL.17 
In light of the significance of state practice, the ICJ’s approach 
to determining its content and relevance can shed considerable 
light on the Court’s actual performance of its task.  Accordingly 
this Article will, in the next Section, discuss twenty-seven cases 
decided by the ICJ over the period 1984–2007,18 highlighting the 
approach taken in the cases to issues involving the relationship 
between state practice on the one hand and either determination of 
the content of a CIL rule, or interpretation of a treaty, on the 
other.19  That Section will be organized according to the various 
ways the Court can deal with state practice.  For example, it might 
rely heavily on state practice to decide a case turning on a point of 
CIL, or, conversely, pay no attention to existing state practice in 
such a case.  The following Section will analyze the Court’s 
performance as revealed in the case narratives.  The last Section 
will conclude. 
2. STATE PRACTICE IN THE ICJ, 1984-2007 
As noted above, state practice is central to analysis of CIL 
questions, and can be relevant to treaty analysis as well.  The 
following discussion will treat these two types of cases separately.  
These two subsections will then be further divided according to the 
way the Court dealt with state practice.  Some cases involve more 
 
 17 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. 
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 586 (Sept. 11) (“The Chamber considers that . . . 
customary law contemplate[s] that such practice may be taken into account for 
purposes of interpretation . . . .”). 
 18 This period was selected because 1984 was the year the application was 
filed in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), a 
case which focused considerable attention on the Court’s use of state practice. 
 19 In East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (Jun. 30), states’ practice of 
concluding treaties with Indonesia capable of application in a territory, the status 
of which was in dispute, was relied on by the Court to show that those states had 
not read certain United Nations resolutions as requiring them not to recognize 
Indonesian control over the territory.  Id. at 103.  In Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 
I.C.J. 595 (July 11), states’ practice in recognizing the status of the head of state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by acknowledging the force of treaties bearing his signature 
was relied on as part of the reason to reject an argument that the head of state 
lacked capacity to formally approve Bosnia-Herzegovina’s decision to bring the 
case.  In both of these cases, state practice was relevant only as evidence of states’ 
attitudes toward a particular fact situation, not as an element in the determination 
of the content of a rule of law.  This Article therefore does not address these cases. 
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than one type of analysis, and therefore will be discussed in more 
than one place. 
2.1. CIL 
2.1.1. Introduction 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out the sources from 
which the Court is required to draw the legal rules it applies: 
Article 38 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance 
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply: 
 a.  international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
 b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
 c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
 d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, the parties agree thereto.20 
According to the Statute, therefore, customary law is to be 
derived from the “general practice of states.”  The International 
Law Association has provided the following working definition of 
customary international law: 
(i) Subject to the Sections which follow, a rule of customary 
international law is one which is created and sustained by 
the constant and uniform practice of States and other 
subjects of international law in or impinging upon their 
 
 20 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 38. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
302 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
international legal relations, in circumstances which give 
rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the 
future. 
(ii) If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of 
States participate in such a practice in a consistent manner, 
the resulting rule is one of “general customary international 
law”.  Subject to Section 15, such a rule is binding on all 
States.21 
Some sense of the ICJ’s own sense of the application of Article 
38(1)(b) is provided by its decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases (F.R.G. v. Denmark; F.R.G v. Netherlands).22  Regarding the 
argument that the Convention on the Continental Shelf had passed 
into customary international law, the Court stated: 
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as 
necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to 
have become a general rule of international law, it might be 
that, even without the passage of any considerable period 
of time, a very widespread and representative participation 
in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it 
included that of States whose interests were specially 
affected.23 
Putting these two discussions together, it seems fair to argue 
that it is necessary that a significant number of states follow a 
practice before it can be labeled a rule of customary law.  We also 
 
 21 Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Int’l Law Ass’n, Final 
Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, 69 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 712, 719 (2000). 
 22 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
 23 Id. at 42.  In this case, the Court held that the number of states adhering to 
the Convention at the relevant time was insufficient to establish that its rules had 
become CIL.  There were thirty-nine parties to that Convention as of the date of 
the Court’s decision.  See U.N. Treaty Series, Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
http://treaties.un.org (follow "U.N. Treaty Series" hyperlink; scroll and select 
"Continental Shelf Convention"; select "see details").  Meanwhile the membership 
of the United Nations on that date (including land-locked states and others 
uninterested in the Convention, was 126.  See United Nations, Growth in United 
Nations Membership, 1945–present, http://www.un.org/members 
/growth.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2009) (listing countries that joined the United 
Nations year by year). 
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see that, in the opinion of the International Law Association, the 
practice must be uniform, which makes sense:  it is difficult to 
characterize as a custom a practice some members of a group 
follow and other members of the same group do not. 
At this point, a definition is necessary.  The term “state 
practice” could conceivably be held to apply to anything done by 
someone who is part of the state apparatus.  If the term is applied 
so broadly, however, it would seem to cover a large enough range 
of behaviors to confuse analysis; very different sorts of state action 
would be lumped together.  Therefore, I propose to limit the use of 
the term “state practice” to behaviors respecting a particular issue 
that amounts to direct action by, or has a direct effect on, the state 
whose behavior is in question.  For example, resolving a border 
dispute by sending military units to occupy the disputed border 
would clearly amount to state practice under this definition.  So 
would a formal proclamation by which a state claimed the territory 
at issue, or a diplomatic protest of another state’s occupying that 
territory.  On the other hand, a state representative’s vote in favor 
of a non-binding resolution in some international body taking a 
position on a border dispute to which the voting state was not a 
party would have no effect on that state, and would therefore not 
count under this definition.  A fortiori, a state’s vote for a non-
binding resolution purporting to establish general rules for 
addressing border disputes—since no specific issue would be 
involved—would likewise not count under this definition. 
The reason for this distinction is to highlight the difference 
between behavior which a state’s officials should see as 
committing the state in some way and behavior not likely to be 
seen by such officials as a commitment.  In the former case, the 
state has to be prepared to deal with other states’ reactions to its 
behavior.  In the latter, there may well be no reactions to consider.  
Clearly then, a state must carefully consider behaviors of the first 
sort, while one cannot assume that state officials will seriously 
ponder the consequences of behaviors of the second sort. 
Finally, note Article 38(1)(d) of the I.C.J. statute.  That provision 
permits the Court to rely on judicial opinions and scholarly 
commentary, but only as subsidiary means of determining the 
content of international law.  Those sources, that is, are not 
equivalent to the general practice of states.  Further, reliance on 
judicial decisions is made subject to Article 59 of the Statute, which 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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provides that the Court’s decisions have “no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”24  Stare 
decisis, in other words, is rejected as a generator of rules of 
international law. 
In examining the Court’s decisions regarding customary 
international law, then, we would expect the Court to derive the 
rules it applies from commitment-generating state behavior. 
2.1.2. CIL Cases—Rule of Decision Derived from Description of 
State Practice 
While the ICJ decided a number of cases during this period on 
the basis of CIL, only one turned on a rule of CIL which the Court 
derived from explicitly described state practice.  Two others relied 
on more or less generally described state practice as one of the 
sources of the rule applied, but relied on non-practice based 
sources as well.  Finally, the Court decided one case based on the 
absence of state practice supporting the rule for which the 
applicant contended. 
The case turning on a rule derived from state practice was 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 
(Nuclear Weapons Case).25  That case was produced in response to 
the General Assembly’s December, 1994, question:  “Is the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?”26 
The Court first addressed the question whether any treaty 
clearly prohibited the use of or threat to use nuclear weapons, 
concluding, as will be discussed in more detail below, that none 
did.27  The Court then moved on to examine the customary law on 
the subject.  It initially took the orthodox position that the 
substance of customary law depended mainly on state practice and 
state views of opinio juris.28  States arguing against the legality of 
nuclear weapons had asserted that the fact of their non-use 
subsequent to World War II established a customary rule of 
 
 24 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 59. 
 25 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case). 
 26 Id. at 227–28. 
 27 Id. at 247–53.  See also infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text.  
(discussing the Court’s method of interpreting treaties asserted to prohibit the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons). 
 28 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 253. 
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prohibition, while those taking the opposite view stressed the 
significance of the reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.29  In 
rejecting the argument that this history established a customary 
law prohibition, the Court stated: 
The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the 
practice known as the “policy of deterrence.”  It notes that it 
is a fact that a number of States adhered to that practice 
during the greater part of the Cold War and continue to 
adhere to it. Furthermore, the members of the international 
community are profoundly divided on the matter of 
whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 
years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris.  Under 
these circumstances the Court does not consider itself able 
to find that there is such an opinio juris.30 
Nuclear weapons opponents also put forward certain General 
Assembly resolutions as confirming a customary law prohibition 
on such weapons.  The Court responded to this point by 
acknowledging that such resolutions “can, in certain 
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the 
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris,”31 but 
asserted that whether any particular resolution should be 
understood as having this effect depended on the resolution’s 
content, on the circumstances of its adoption, and on whether 
opinio juris existed regarding the resolution’s status.32  The 
resolutions in question here, the Court held, could not be seen as 
demonstrating an opinio juris with respect to nuclear weapons 
because substantial numbers of states either voted against their 
adoption or abstained on the matter.33 
Turning finally to international humanitarian law, the Court 
asserted that the principal treaties in the field have entered 
customary law, relying in part on the extensive number of parties 
to those treaties and on the fact that no state had ever taken 
advantage of the denunciation clauses of those treaties.34  The 
 
 29 Id. at 253–54. 
 30 Id. at 254 (italics in original). 
 31 Id. at 254–55 (italics in original). 
 32 Id. at 255. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 257–58. 
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question then became whether customary international 
humanitarian law derived from those treaties rendered illegal the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons.  The Court specifically addressed 
the effect on CIL of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions35 (treating the matter as one of CIL presumably 
because of the protocol’s non-ratification by three of the five 
nuclear powers) concluding that the conference which drafted that 
treaty produced no substantive debate on nuclear weapons and 
adopted no provisions addressed to them, and that the Additional 
Protocol therefore did not affect otherwise subsisting customary 
law regarding nuclear weapons.36 
The Court finally confronted squarely the question of the 
compatibility of nuclear weapons with purely customary 
international humanitarian law.  Its response was to evade the 
question.  On the one hand, the Court observed that it could not 
pass on the argument that nuclear weapons could lawfully be used 
in certain limited circumstances, since the proponents of that view 
could not be precise in identifying those circumstances.37  On the 
other hand, the Court—though observing that the use of nuclear 
weapons “seems scarcely compatible with respect” for 
humanitarian law principles—concluded that it lacked the basis for 
concluding that the use of nuclear weapons could never be lawful.  
The Court fortified this conclusion by reference to the fundamental 
character of a state’s right to survival and thus of its right to self-
defense in circumstances threatening its survival, on deterrence as 
a matter of state practice, and on the reservations by nuclear 
weapons states to the various treaties addressing those weapons, 
under which those states reserved the right to use such weapons in 
defined circumstances.38 
Ultimately, with respect to the crucial issue in the case, the 
Court’s conclusion, expressed in paragraph 2(e) of the disposition 
in this case, was 
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally 
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
 
 35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 36 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 259. 
 37 Id. at 262. 
 38 Id. at 262–63. 
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armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, 
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot 
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake . . . .39  
Paragraph 2(e) was adopted only by the casting vote of the 
President, showing how deeply divided the Court was regarding 
this case; indeed, the scope of the division may have been even 
greater than this result suggests.40  Nonetheless, the Court as a 
body was unwilling to ignore states’ actual behavior regarding an 
issue as fundamental as the legality of nuclear weapons. 
The first case relying on state practice as one among several 
sources of CIL rules was Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. 
Malta).41  The parties in this case sought from the court a 
delimitation between their continental shelves, agreeing that their 
dispute had to be resolved according to CIL as it related to such 
delimitations.42 
The Court relied solely on state practice in parts of its 
judgment.  Regarding the issue of the place in customary law of a 
 
 39 Id. at 266. 
 40 All fourteen judges hearing this case wrote separate opinions.  Id. at 268–
593.  Given the outcome, it is surprising to note that eight of them seem to have 
been unwilling to treat state practice regarding nuclear weapons, as well as the 
implications of various treaties and Security Council resolutions on the subject, as 
controlling the question of the legality of the use of those weapons.  Instead, most 
of these eight (all but Judge Herczegh), put controlling weight on some 
combination of ethical or general legal principles, General Assembly resolutions, 
or the asserted irrelevance of state practice.  Id. at 269–70 (declaration of Bedjaoui, 
Pres.); id. at 275 (declaration of Herczegh, J.); id. at 278 (declaration of Shi, J.); id. at 
280–81 (declaration of Vereshchetin, J.); id. at 282–83 (declaration of Ferrari Bravo, 
J.); id. at 287, 291 (separate opinion of Guillaume, J.); id. at 294–97 (separate 
opinion of Ranjeva, J.); id. at 309 (separate opinion of  Fleischhauer, J.); id. at 311–
28 (dissenting opinion of Schwebel, Vice-Pres.); id. at 345–64 (dissenting opinion 
of Oda, J.); id. at 380–89, 392–97, 399–428 (dissenting opinion of Shahbuddeen, J.); 
id. at 452–87, 494–96, 513–20, 532–42, 553 (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.); 
id. at 556, 558–71, 575–76, 578–79 (dissenting opinion of Koroma, J.); id. at 591 
(dissenting opinion of Higgins, J.). 
 41 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3). 
 42 Id. at 29. 
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boundary’s distance from the relevant coasts as a criterion for shelf 
boundary delimitation, the Court stated: “that, apart from 
[provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea], the 
institution of the exclusive economic zone, with its rule on 
entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States 
to have become a part of customary law . . . .”43  In discussing its 
rejection of the proposition that, at least as a first step, a proposed 
boundary line should be one on which every point was equally 
distance from the coasts of the states in question (an equidistance 
line), the court acknowledged that the parties had brought to its 
attention over seventy shelf delimitation agreements.  It went on to 
state, however, that, although state practice on this subject was 
important, the agreements, taken together, fell short of proving 
that use of an equidistance line or any other method was 
mandatory, though they did show that such a method could yield 
an equitable result in many circumstances.44 
State practice, albeit unspecified, was one of several sources on 
which the Court relied in other portions of the opinion: that 
rejecting Libya’s assertion that the size of a state’s landmass was 
relevant to shelf delimitation,45 that disagreeing with the argument 
that the ratio of the lengths of the coastlines of the relevant states 
should determine the proportion of the shelf each would receive,46 
and in holding that, if an equidistance line is used as the first stage 
of the exercise, it could subsequently be modified.47 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium) (DRC v. Belgium) was the other case treating state 
practice as one of several possible sources of CIL.48  In that case, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) alleged that Belgium 
had incurred responsibility to the Congo by issuing an 
international warrant for the arrest of the then-sitting foreign 
minister of the Congo—not present in Belgium at the time—in 
respect of grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
allegedly committed by the minister on the territory of the 
 
 43 Id. at 33. 
 44 Id. at 38. 
 45 Id. at 40–41. 
 46 Id. at 45. 
 47 Id. at 48. 
 48 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium). 
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Congo.49  After concluding that a sitting foreign minister enjoys full 
immunity from criminal prosecution,50 the Court asked if there 
were an exception to this rule with respect to accusations of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.  It was at this point that state 
practice figured in the Court’s analysis.  Specifically, the Court 
observed that it had considered the “few decisions of national 
higher courts,” including two cases cited by the parties decided 
respectively by the House of Lords and the Court of Cassation of 
France, but not indicating whether it considered other cases as 
well.  It also stated that it had considered unspecified national 
legislation.  In addition to its references to these examples of state 
practice, the Court cited to the legal instruments creating 
international criminal tribunals and decisions of certain of those 
tribunals.  On the basis of all of these materials, the Court stated 
that it found no exception to the rule of immunity before national 
courts with respect to sitting foreign ministers.51 
Finally, the case putting weight on the absence of state practice 
supporting the applicant was Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of 
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), (Preliminary Objections) 
(Diallo Case);52 the case also involved arguments based on 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
Guinea brought this case as a matter of diplomatic protection to 
seek reparation on behalf of one of its nationals and certain private 
corporations of which this national was the sole share-holder but 
which were chartered in the DRC.53  Guinea sought to establish 
that, as a matter of customary law, a state was permitted to 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of such corporations, 
relying on dictum from an ICJ case, a number of arbitral opinions, 
and the fact that many bilateral and multilateral treaties relating to 
the protection of foreign investment permit such representation.54  
The Court rejected Guinea’s argument, stating that it had 
examined “State practice and decisions of international courts and 
tribunals” but found no exception to the usual rule that states may 
 
 49 Id. at 9–10. 
 50 Id. at 20–22. 
 51 Id. at 23–24. 
 52 Preliminary Objections, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. 
Congo) 46 I.L.M. 712 (Diallo Case). 
 53 Id. at 716. 
 54 Id. at 731–32. 
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exercise diplomatic protection only on behalf of nationals.55  It 
went on to observe: 
The fact invoked by Guinea that various international 
agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments and the Washington 
Convention, have established special legal régimes 
governing investment protection, or that provisions in this 
regard are commonly included in contracts entered into 
directly between States and foreign investors, is not 
sufficient to show that there has been a change in the 
customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally 
show the contrary. The arbitrations relied on by Guinea are 
also special cases, whether based on specific international 
agreements between two or more States, including the one 
responsible for the allegedly unlawful acts regarding the 
companies concerned . . . or based on agreements 
concluded directly between a company and the State 
allegedly responsible for the prejudice to it . . . .56 
The Court in this case applied a fairly rigorous standard to 
determine what counted as state practice regarding diplomatic 
protection. 
2.1.3. CIL Cases:  State Practice Available, but Rule of Decision 
Derived from Other Sources 
In a number of cases, the Court has determined that a rule of 
CIL existed without referring to state practice, even though 
practice existed and supported its result.  Rather, the Court 
asserted that sources other than state practice had given rise to a 
rule of law.  In some of these cases, some of those other sources 
could be characterized as “subsidiary means for the determination 
of a rule of law” under Article 38 of the statute,57 while other 
sources on which the Court relied do not seem to fall within any  of 
the categories of Article 38. 
The first such case during the period under discussion was 
styled Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
 
 55 Id. at 732. 
 56 Id.  
 57 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, art. 38(1)(d). 
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(Canada v. United States of America) (the “Gulf of Maine Case”).58  The 
parties had asked the Court to determine “the course of the single 
maritime boundary that divides the continental shelf and fisheries 
zones of Canada and the United States of America [in the Gulf of 
Maine].”59 
The Court observed the parties made no argument supporting 
the possibility of drawing such a boundary, simply assuming such 
a thing was possible, and concluded “there is certainly no rule of 
international law to the contrary.”60  In other words, the Court saw 
no legal problem presented by the desire of two states to claim 
fishing zones extending 200 miles out from their respective 
coasts.61  Although the concept of such zones was relatively new at 
the time of the ICJ decision, over 100 states had nonetheless made 
claims to economic control over zones 200 miles in breadth, these 
claims covered more than 85% of the area potentially subject to 
such claims throughout the world.62 
However, the Court did not base its conclusion regarding CIL 
on this record of practice.  Rather, the Court stressed that the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted 
provisions establishing rules regarding the continental shelf and 
the exclusive economic zone without objection by any of the many 
states participating in that conference, that the United States had 
proclaimed an exclusive economic zone, and that Canada had 
indicated agreement with the concept.  It proceeded in this fashion, 
moreover, even as it acknowledged that the treaty adopted by the 
Conference—the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
 
 58 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case). 
 59 Id. at 261. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. at 277–78, 302 (discussing the claims of the United States and Canada 
over the delimitation of maritime boundaries). 
 62 See generally ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMS (1986) 
(introducing various maritime claims made by different countries); see also Sea 
Around Us Project, Web Products: Countries’ EEZ: Equatorial Guinea, 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/summaryInfo.aspx?EEZ=226 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2009); Sea Around Us Project, Web Products: Countries’ EEZ: Madagascar, 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/summaryInfo.aspx?EEZ=450 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2009).  The determination that claims covered more than 85% of the area 
potentially subject to claims for economic control throughout the world was made 
by subtracting the areas of the claimed zones of Equatorial Guinea and that of 
Madagascar from the total given by Smith.  See SMITH, supra, at 6. 
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Sea63 (“UNCLOS”)—was not yet in force and that a number of 
states were not likely to become parties to it.64  In fact, as of the 
date of the Court’s judgment, only thirteen states had become 
parties to the Convention, which did not attract the sixty 
ratifications required to enter it into force65 until 1993.66  It should 
be noted, however, that at the time of the Court’s judgment, it was 
well known that the United States would not become a party to 
UNCLOS.67 
A second case that could have but did not rely on state practice 
to support some of the CIL rules it applied was Continental Shelf.68  
In connection with the parties’ acknowledgment that the case was 
controlled by CIL, the Court stated: 
It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in 
recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or 
indeed in developing them. . . . [I]t cannot be denied that 
the 1982 Convention is of major importance, having been 
adopted by an overwhelming majority of States; hence it is 
clearly the duty of the Court, even independently of the 
 
 63 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 64 See Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 294 (stating that a number of states do 
not seem inclined to adopt the Convention adopted at the Law of the Sea 
Conference). 
 65 See UNCLOS, supra note 20, art. 308 (requiring ratification by 60 states 
before treaty can enter into force). 
 66 U. N., Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the 
Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the convention and of the 
Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to 
the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks: Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the related 
Agreements, as at 1 October, 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference 
_files/status2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). [hereinafter UNCLOS Status 
Table]. 
 67 See U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty, 82 DEP’T ST. BULL. 71, 71 (1982) 
(quoting U.S. President Ronald Reagan) (declining ratification because the 
convention fails to address the United States objection to the deep seabed mining 
regime the convention adopts). 
 68 See generally Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 3 (June 3) 
(applying customary international law without relying extensively on state 
practice for support). 
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references made to the Convention by the Parties, to 
consider in what degree any of its relevant provisions are 
binding upon the Parties as a rule of customary 
international law.69 
The Court also expressly stated that it was relying on the work 
of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, which produced the 1982 
Convention.  Thus, the Court cited the work of the Conference to 
support the conclusion that the “institution of the exclusive 
economic zone” had passed into CIL. It did not, however, refer to 
the fact of the proclamation of exclusive economic zones by a great 
many states.70  Rejecting Libya’s assertion that the size of a state’s 
landmass was relevant to shelf delimitation, the Court asserted a 
lack of support “in the work of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.”71  Similarly, the Court cited 
states’ expression of their views at the Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, specifically the argument that the ratio of the lengths of the 
coastlines of the relevant states should determine the proportion of 
the shelf each would receive.72  In rejecting the argument that an 
equidistance line used as the first stage of delimitation cannot be 
modified, the Court relied on the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf,73 and on the drafting history of UNCLOS.74 
It is important to understand that only 19 states had ratified 
UNCLOS as of the date of the Court’s judgment.75  The Court’s 
statement that the convention was “adopted” by the overwhelming 
majority of states thus makes sense only if the Court is referring to 
the approval of the Convention text by the states participating in 
the Law of the Sea Conference—it cannot be referring to states’ 
acceptance of the Convention as a binding treaty.  Given the low 
level of formal acceptance of UNCLOS at this time, the Court’s 
 
 69 Id. at 29–30 (italics in original). 
 70 Id. at 33. 
 71 Id. at 40–41. 
 72 See id. at 45 (discussing Libya’s contention that proportionality should 
determine delimitation). 
 73 See generally Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 
471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (discussing delimitation of the continental shelf between 
states with shared boundaries). 
 74 See Continental Shelf Case, 1985 I.C.J. at 48 (citing the work of the 
Conference on the Law of the Sea to support its proposition). 
 75 UNCLOS Status Table, supra note 66. 
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reliance on it and on the conference that produced it is somewhat 
surprising. 
In another delimitation dispute, Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway),76 the 
Court again refrained from relying on available state practice.  In 
this case, the Court was asked to delimit the continental shelves 
and fishery zones of the Danish island of Greenland and the small 
Norwegian island of Jan Mayen, about 250 nautical miles to the 
east of Greenland.77  The Court concluded that CIL would control 
the delimitation of the fishery zone.78  However, in determining the 
applicable rule of CIL, the Court made no reference to the 
numerous state proclamations of exclusive economic zones.  
Instead, the Court cited the award of an arbitral tribunal made in 
1977 and its own decision in the Continental Shelf Case to support its 
conclusion that the same principles governed both the shelf and 
the fishery zone delimitation.  The Court also asserted that the 
provisions of UNCLOS relating to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone reflected the CIL 
on the subject but did not explain this conclusion even though it 
noted that UNCLOS had not yet come into force.79  The Court’s 
subsequent references to the content of customary law in this case 
relied on judicial decisions, the language of treaties, and the work 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.80 
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia),81 the Court 
again failed to cite available practice to support a conclusion 
regarding the content of CIL.  The case arose from a dispute over a 
1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia under which the 
parties had agreed to jointly construct a system of locks on the 
Danube, which formed their boundary.82  In October 1989, 
Hungary abandoned the project; it purported to terminate the 
treaty in May 1992.  In April 1993, Hungary and Slovakia—as 
 
 76 See generally Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen (Den. v. Nor.) (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14) (relying on 
customary international law to settle dispute over delimitation). 
 77 Id. at 42–44. 
 78 Id. at 56–58. 
 79 Id. at 59. 
 80 Id. at 60–62. 
 81 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).  
 82 Id. at 17–18 (setting out the nature of the dispute before the court and the 
matters provided for in the treaty). 
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successor to Czechoslovakia—entered into an agreement to bring 
before the Court Slovakia’s claim that Hungary had breached the 
1977 treaty.83 
One of the issues in this case was whether Slovakia succeeded 
to Czechoslovakia’s rights under the treaty.  To resolve this point, 
the Court simply quoted the International Law Commission (ILC) 
to the effect that both traditional doctrine and modern opinion 
accept the rule that a succession of states does not affect treaties of 
a territorial character.84  The Court made no reference to the ILC’s 
careful analysis of state practice supporting this proposition.85 
In Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
(Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion), the Court again characterized 
a rule as CIL without reference to supporting practice.86  The 
General Assembly sought this advisory opinion to assist it in 
dealing with a dispute arising out of Malaysia’s treatment of an 
individual who, at the relevant time, was serving as a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. 87  It was argued 
that Malaysia’s actions violated the treaty regulating the privileges 
and immunities of U.N. officials.  In the course of examining the 
events giving rise to the case, the Court had occasion to assert that 
“the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an act of 
that State.”88  Although it characterized that rule as customary,89 
the Court supported this conclusion only by reference to draft 
 
 83 Id. at 18, 25, 27, 31–34. 
 84 See id. at 72 (“[T]he International Law Commission identified ‘treaties of a 
territorial character’ as having been regarded both in traditional doctrine and in 
modern opinion as unaffected by a succession of States.”) (citation omitted). 
 85 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/9610/Rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 154, 184–86, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc 
/documentation/english/A_9610.pdf (reviewing state practice and noting that 
often a successor state’s willingness to continue the effect of treaties plays a role in 
whether or not those treaties remain in effect). 
 86 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 
62 (Apr. 29) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion]. 
 87 See id. at 63–64 (reproducing the request from the Economic and Social 
Council for the I.C.J. to rule on a disagreement with Malaysia regarding immunity 
of Special Rapporteurs). 
 88 Id. at 87. 
 89 Id. 
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articles on state responsibility provisionally adopted by the ILC.90  
It made no reference to state practice even though the ILC had 
included detailed analysis of state practice in its commentary on 
the relevant article.91 
2.1.4. CIL Cases—Judgment Based on Rules of Decision Derived 
from Subsidiary Sources 
In several cases decided in part on CIL grounds, the Court 
purported to derive rules of law wholly or partly from sources 
listed in Article 38(1)(d) of its statutes as “subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”  Included in this group are cases 
decided by the Court on the basis of rules it derived by analogy to 
established rules of international law. 
Cases relying primarily on subsidiary sources include Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras; 
Nicaragua intervening), a case involving disputes between El 
Salvador and Honduras over several portions of their land 
boundary and over their conflicting claims as to sovereignty over 
certain islands in the Gulf of Fonseca.92  The Court was also asked 
to determine the parties “legal situation” vis-à-vis both the Gulf 
itself and waters outside the Gulf.93 
In resolving this case, the Court relied on certain black letter 
principles of international law,94 and on its own exegesis of these 
principles and those of other international tribunals and 
commentators.95  Indeed, at one point in the opinion it expressly 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/9010/ Rev. 1 (1974), reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 161, 195, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc 
/documentation/english/A_9010.pdf (referencing state practice in support of the 
claim that acts of a judicial branch could be viewed as attributable to the state). 
 92 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar. 
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 350 (Sept. 11). 
 93 Id. at 380. 
 94 See id. at 386–87 (uti posseditis juris); id. at 546–49 (avulsion); id. at 586 (rule 
that treaty parties’ practice may be used to interpret treaty; concept of historic 
bays). 
 95 See, e.g., id. at 387–401 (Arbitral Award of the Swiss Federal Council, 
International Court of Justice); id. at 563–65 (Arbitration of the Island of Palmas, 
Permanent Court of International Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 
589–93 (International Court of Justice, Central American Court of Justice); id. at 
597 (Central American Court of Justice); id. at 600–01 (Central American Court of 
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characterized its approach as one of relying on “subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.”96  It cited no other type of 
authority even as it purported to apply CIL.97 
In Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad),98 the 
Court was asked to determine the land boundary between Libya 
and Chad.99  In part, it based its judgment on international judicial 
decisions, including its own.100  Although the Court characterized 
as CIL a number of the other legal rules it applied in this case, it 
did not ground any of them in state practice. 
In Hungary v. Slovakia,101 the Court supported the conclusion 
that some of the rules the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties102 (Treaties Convention) stated customary international 
law solely by reference to its own opinions.103  Also, in considering 
the scope of riparian states’ rights to use international rivers, it 
cited a decision by the PCIJ.104 
In Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia),105 the Court was 
faced with a territorial dispute which the parties agreed was 
controlled by a nineteenth century treaty between Great Britain 
and Germany, then the colonial powers controlling the areas in 
dispute.106  The Court relied only upon its own jurisprudence in 
asserting the CIL status of Article 31 of the Treaties Convention,107 
including the language of that provision requiring reliance on 
 
Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 607–09 (Central American Court of 
Justice, International Court of Justice). 
 96 Id. at 601. 
 97 See id. at 586 (stating that customary international law allows for the 
consideration of subsequent state practice in interpreting  treaty terms). 
 98 Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
 99 Id. at 14. 
 100 See, e.g., id. at 23 (International Court of Justice); id. at 25 (Permanent Court 
of International Justice, International Court of Justice); id. at 35 (treaties and 
charters of international bodies) (outlining Libya and Chad’s respective requests 
for clarification of their boundaries). 
 101 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
 102 Treaties Convention, supra note 16. 
 103 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 38 (“[The court] needs only 
to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to hold that some of 
the rules laid down in that Convention might be considered as a codification of 
existing customary law.”). 
 104 Id. at 56. 
 105 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13). 
 106 Id. at 1049. 
 107 Treaties Convention, supra note 16, art. 31. 
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subsequent practice of treaty parties as an aspect of treaty 
interpretation.108  The Court relied on statements by writers and 
determinations of arbitral tribunals to define a relevant term.109  It 
also relied on treaty practice in general to address several issues in 
the case.110  The one treaty on which it specifically relied was cited 
to explain the Court’s method of determining the proper measure 
of the width of a river; in this connection, the Court also cited a 
decision by the United States Supreme Court, and two arbitral 
awards.111 
Again, in the case concerning the Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),112 
the Court relied on a PCIJ decision for the proposition that 
Bahrain’s limited activities on a disputed island were adequate to 
permit it to assert sovereignty,113 applying that rule to resolve what 
it had described as an issue of CIL.114  It relied on its own cases in 
holding that the disputed island was so insignificant that it should 
not be given full effect with respect to the determination of the 
boundary between the parties’ territorial seas.115  It also derived 
from its decisions the principles it applied to delimit a single 
boundary between the parties’ continental shelves and exclusive 
economic zones,116 and reasoned by analogy to established 
principles of maritime law to resolve the question of the effect of a 
low-tide elevation on a maritime delimitation.117 
 
 108 See Kasikili/Sedudu Island, 1999 I.C.J. at 1059 (noting that the parties agreed 
to the application of Article 31 “inasmuch as it reflects customary international 
law”); id. at 1075 (detailing the applicability of “subsequent practice” by the 
parties involved upon treaty interpretation under Article 31). 
 109 See id. at 1064 (pointing towards the treatment of the term “main channel” 
in scientific reports and arbitral decisions as potentially influential in defining the 
term). 
 110 See, e.g., id. at 1061–62 (noting that “various definitions of the term 
‘thalweg’ are found in treaties delimiting boundaries and that the concepts of the 
thalweg of a watercourse and the centre of a watercourse are not equivalent.”). 
 111 Id. at 1066. 
 112 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain, (Qatar v. Bahrain), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16). 
 113 See id. at 100 (noting that in the past “the tribunal has been satisfied with 
very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights”). 
 114 Id. at 91. 
 115  See id. at 104, 109 (noting the small size of the island in question and 
referencing past decisions discussing situations where such land might have a 
“disproportionate effect” with respect to its size on national boundaries). 
 116 See id. at 110–15 (describing this analysis). 
 117 Id. at 102–03. 
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Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. 
Malaysia)118 was a dispute over two small islands in the Celebes 
Sea.  In addressing a relevant treaty, the Court once again repeated 
its ascription of CIL status to the rule that requires the Court to 
take account of treaty parties’ practice when interpreting a treaty, 
relying solely on its own decisions.119  It also relied on its own 
decisions when, after concluding that a particular treaty did not 
apply to the islands in question, it enunciated the rules of law to be 
applied to the parties’ arguments based on their respective 
activities relative to the islands.120 
In yet another boundary case, Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea 
Intervening),121 the Court relied solely on its own decisions to 
determine a relevant legal standard.122  The Court supported its 
conclusion that Great Britain, during the time it claimed 
sovereignty over Nigeria as a colonial power, possessed the 
authority to conclude a treaty relevant to another issue by a very 
general reference to the practice of European powers regarding 
their African colonies, and by citations to an arbitral award and to 
two of its own decisions.  The Court put forward no specific 
examples of state practice in this connection.123  Meanwhile, the 
Court resolved other issues in the case by relying on the practice of 
the parties and on the effect of certain actions taken by the United 
Nations during the period that the area in dispute was a Trust 
Territory; it decided still others by reference to arbitral awards and 
to certain of its own decisions.124 
In addition to the foregoing, and as noted above,125 the Court in 
the Arrest Warrant Case126 relied in part on the legal instruments 
 
 118 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 
2002 I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17). 
 119 Id. at 645–46. 
 120 Id. at 668, 678, 682. 
 121 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 
v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10). 
 122 Id. at 352–55, 401–16. 
 123 Id. at 404–07. 
 124 Id. at 407–16. 
 125 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51 (discussing the details of Dem. 
Rep. Conogo v. Belgium, a case treating state practice as one of several possible 
sources of CIL). 
 126 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium). 
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creating international criminal tribunals and to decisions of certain 
of those tribunals.127  As also discussed above,128 in the Diallo 
Case,129 the Court relied on draft articles produced by the 
International Law Commission and certain excerpts from its own 
decisions to define the concept of diplomatic protection, to 
establish the claimant state’s obligation to establish either that such 
local remedies that were available were exhausted or that 
exceptional circumstances prevented exhaustion, and for 
proposition that it was for the respondent state to show that there 
were local remedies available but not exhausted.130 
2.1.5. CIL Cases - Authority for the Court’s Judgment Either Not 
Apparent or Doubtful 
In five cases decided during this period, the Court either cited 
no basis for its assertions as to the content of CIL or relied solely on 
sources of law of questionable authority. 
The first such case was Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits131 
(Nicaragua).  Among the state practice issues that this case 
presented was one involving the concept of state practice itself.  In 
its discussion of the nature of state practice sufficient to establish 
and maintain a rule of CIL, the Court stated: 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must 
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. . . .  If a 
State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a 
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to 
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, 
then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable 
 
 127 Id. at 23–24. 
 128 See supra text accompanying notes 52–56 (discussing the details of the 
standard applied in the Diallo Case to determine what counted as state practice 
regarding diplomatic protection). 
 129 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 46 
I.L.M. 712. 
 130 Id. at 728–30. 
 131 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27). 
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on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm 
rather than to weaken the rule.132 
In essence, the Court asserts that contrary practice does not 
undermine the existence of a rule of CIL so long as the state 
engaging in that practice proffers an explanation grounded in the 
rule, even, apparently, if that explanation is made in bad faith.  
Nothing in the Court’s opinion qualifies this assertion even for 
cases in which the bad faith of the acting state is patent.  The Court 
cites no authority of any sort to support this statement of the law. 
A second state practice issue in the case was identifying the 
content of the relevant rule of CIL.  In a confusing passage, the 
Court noted the parties’ agreement on the CIL status of the U.N. 
Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, but nonetheless saw itself 
as obliged to verify the existence of opinio juris consistent with this 
position.  It purported to find the necessary evidence in the 
General Assembly’s adoption of its Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States133 between states, asserting: 
The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot 
be understood as merely that of a “reiteration or 
elucidation” of the treaty commitment undertaken in the 
Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an 
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared 
by the resolution by themselves.134 
The Court did not explain why consent to the resolution must 
be understood as it asserts; it merely made the assertion.  Similarly 
unexplained was the Court’s conclusion that the United States 
itself had demonstrated opinio juris with respect to this CIL 
principle by its acceptance of two non-binding resolutions at 
international conferences and by ratifying a regional treaty.135 
This case also required the Court to determine the legal 
responsibility of the United States for the acts of the contra 
 
 132 Id. at 98. 
 133 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) 
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. 
 134 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 100. 
 135 Id. 
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guerrillas directed against Nicaragua.136  The Court resolved the 
issue as follows: 
The Court has taken the view . . . that United States 
participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the 
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of 
the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary 
targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is 
still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of attributing to 
the United States the acts committed by the contras in the 
course of their military or paramilitary operations in 
Nicaragua. . . . For this conduct to give rise to legal 
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle 
have to be proved that that State had effective control of the 
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which 
the alleged violations were committed.137 
The Court cited no authority for this standard. 
The Nicaragua Court relied on other supposed CIL rules, the 
sources of which it did not explain, in addressing the United 
States’s argument that, even if its behavior was otherwise 
unlawful, it was in any event justified as an exercise of collective 
self-defense with respect to actions taken by Nicaragua affecting 
other Central American states, particularly El Salvador.138  The 
Court acknowledged that the right of self-defense was a matter of 
customary law, citing the U.N. Charter and certain General 
Assembly declarations in support but making no reference to state 
practice.139  The Court therefore had to address the content of the 
customary law of self-defense.  It noted that the United States’ 
argument that it had engaged in lawful self-defense depended on 
the assertion by the United States that Nicaragua had perpetrated 
an armed attack on El Salvador; the Court, however, stressed that 
the actions of Nicaragua were said to have involved “provision of 
weapons or logistical or other support”140 and asserted that such 
actions, though they could amount to a threat of force or an 
intervention, could not be considered armed attacks triggering the 
 
 136 Id. at 53–65. 
 137 Id. at 64–65. 
 138 Id. at 72. 
 139 Id. at 102–03. 
 140 Id. at 103–04. 
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right of the victim of the attack to respond in self-defense.141  The 
Court did not explain the basis for this distinction. 
The Court also stated that the right of a state to engage in 
collective self-defense on behalf of a second state depended on a 
request for such aid from the first state to the second, citing in 
reliance two inter-American treaties, and asserting that, apart from 
inter-American law, general international law imposed a similar 
requirement.142  Again, it provided no examples of state practice to 
demonstrate the existence of this requirement. 
The Nuclear Weapons Case provides an example of reliance on 
sources whose law-making character is doubtful.  In asserting that 
“States must take environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of 
legitimate military objectives,”143 the Court relied on a non-binding 
declaration made at a United Nations Conference, a General 
Assembly resolution, and an order the Court had made in an 
earlier case.144  It also relied on Articles 35(3) and 55 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,145 
forbidding the use of methods of warfare intended to or which 
may be expected to cause very severe, long-term environmental 
damage and requiring war-making states to protect against such 
damage;146 however, the CIL status of these articles at the time of 
the Court’s decision is unclear.147  If those articles were not CIL at 
 
 141 Id. at 104. 
 142 Id. at 104–05. 
 143 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242 
(July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case). 
 144 Id. at 242–43. 
 145 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 35(3), art. 55, June 8, 1977, U.N.T.S. 17512. 
 146 Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 242 (July 8). 
 147 Since there were 147 parties to the First Additional Protocol at the time of 
the Court’s decision, one could argue that the number of ratifications alone would 
amount to sufficient state practice to establish a rule of CIL. See Table of 
Ratifications of Accessions to Protocol I, available at http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf 
/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).  However, about 
one in five UN members were not parties to the Protocol at that time, including 
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, which casts some doubt 
on that conclusion.  See United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, 
available at http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).  
This doubt is reinforced by Professor Greenwood’s questioning of the CIL status 
of the articles at issue, albeit in an article predating the Court’s decision, 
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the time of the Court’s decision, the Court’s conclusion regarding 
states’ environmental duties in war time was thus based solely on 
reliance on non-binding instruments and on a treaty which did not 
codify CIL. 
DRC v. Belgium148 also involved reliance on doubtful sources to 
determine the content of CIL.  The Court saw this case as turning 
on the immunities international law afforded sitting foreign 
ministers from the jurisdiction of the courts of states other than 
their own.  It acknowledged that the issue was a matter of CIL, 
though it cited treaties addressing closely related issues as 
providing “useful guidance.”149  In its examination of CIL, the 
Court referred solely to functional considerations; it made no 
reference to state practice.  Based on such considerations—and, 
presumably, by analogy to the treaties it had cited—the Court 
concluded that a sitting foreign minister enjoys both full immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and personal inviolability.150  The Court 
closed its judgment by listing various sets of circumstances in 
which sitting foreign ministers could be prosecuted for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.  Only two involved international 
law.  Again, the Court offered no authority supporting its 
conclusion with regard to them, though the rules it announced 
were analogous to those in the treaties it had previously cited. 
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project151 the Court rested its discussion 
of riparian states’ CIL rights to the use of international 
watercourses in part on the adoption of the Convention on the Law 
of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses152 by the 
General Assembly,153 even though that Convention has never come 
into force.154 
 
Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in 
ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179, 190, 195 (2006). 
 148 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (DRC v. 
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). 
 149 Id. at 21. 
 150 Id. at 20–22. 
 151 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
 152 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (May 21, 1997). 
 153 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 55–56. 
 154 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PROJECT, STATUS OF THE WATERCOURSE 
CONVENTION (2008). 
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Another unsourced judgment was Oil Platforms.155  In this case, 
Iran sought reparation for damage the United States had inflicted 
on three Iranian oil-drilling platforms in October, 1987, and April, 
1988.156  The Court’s jurisdiction was based on a 1955 Treaty of 
Amity between the United States and Iran providing that any 
disputes regarding “the interpretation or application” of the treaty 
were to be heard by the I.C.J.157  Iran alleged that the attacks on the 
platforms breached the treaty.  The United States denied that the 
treaty had been breached, but also asserted that, in any event, the 
actions taken by the United States were permitted by an article of 
the treaty providing that the treaty “did not preclude the 
application of measures . . . necessary . . . to protect [a party’s] 
essential security interests.” 
The context of the actions at issue in this case was the Iran-Iraq 
war of 1980–88.  During that period, there were a considerable 
number of attacks on neutral shipping plying the Persian/Arabian 
Gulf.  On October 16, 1987, an American-flag vessel was struck by 
a missile while in the vicinity of Kuwait Harbor.  The United States 
attributed the attack to Iran and, claiming self-defense, attacked 
two oil platforms on October 19.  On April 14, 1988, an American 
warship struck a mine in international waters near Bahrain.  The 
United States again blamed Iran and reacted by attacking Iranian 
installations, including a third oil platform, on April 20, again 
claiming self-defense.158 
The Court stated that it would evaluate the self-defense claim 
by the United States “by reference to international law applicable 
to this question, that is to say, the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and customary international law.”159  With respect 
to each American use of force, the Court asked, first, whether the 
United States had proven that Iran had previously launched an 
attack, second, whether the attack could be considered an “armed 
attack” on the United States, and finally, whether the American 
 
 155 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Oil Platforms), 2003 I.C.J. 161 
(Nov. 6). 
 156  Id. at 166, 169–70. 
 157  Id. at 178. 
 158  Id. at 174–76. 
 159  Id. at 183.  Oddly, instead of first determining whether the actions of the 
United States breached the treaty, and then inquiring whether those measures 
were necessary to protect essential security interests—that is, first considering the 
claim, then turning to the affirmative defense—the Court elected to consider the 
defense first. 
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responses could be said to satisfy tests of necessity and 
proportionality.160  The Court concluded that the United States had 
failed to meet the burden of proving Iranian responsibility for 
either the October 16 or the April 14 attack.161  It also held that the 
actions of which the United States complained could not be labeled 
“armed attacks.”  With respect to the first incident, the Court noted 
that the United States characterized the missile strike on the tanker 
in Kuwait waters as part of a series of attacks to which the United 
States was responding.  It held that these events, even taken 
together, did not amount to an armed attack on the United States, 
since the United States had not proven that the actions were 
specifically directed at United States targets (as opposed to being 
directed at an area where American-flag ships, among others, were 
known to operate). 
Further, the Court seemed to doubt that these actions were 
sufficiently grave to amount to armed attacks.162  The court 
likewise held that the mining of the American warship did not 
constitute an armed attack to which the attacks on the oil platforms 
could be seen as a defensive response.  Indeed, its language 
implied that an attack on a state’s warship was not necessarily an 
armed attack on the state.163  The Court also held that neither 
American response met the necessity standard, observing that the 
United States had not complained to Iran of the use of the oil 
platforms, in contrast to the complaints the United States was 
acknowledged to have made regarding mining activity.164  Finally, 
the Court concluded that the October 19 attack might meet the 
proportionality standard, but held that the April 20 attack did not, 
holding that the damage done in the attack had to be in proportion 
to that suffered by the United States in the mining of the warship, 
as opposed to some other measure of proportionality.165 
The legal standard the Court applied therefore can be summed 
up as (1) a state cannot be the victim of an armed attack unless the 
action of which it complains is directed specifically at it, as 
 
 160 Id. at 189, 191–92, 195–96. 
 161 Id.  at 189–90.  The Court’s analysis of the facts of this case was criticized 
by Judges Higgins, id. at 233–35 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) and 
Buergenthal, id. at 286–88 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal). 
 162 Id. at 191–92. 
 163 Id. at 195–96. 
 164 Id. at 193–94, 198. 
 165 Id. at 198–99. 
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opposed to being an indiscriminate attack that the attacker must 
have known could affect the state attacked; (2) an action, even by a 
state’s military, is not an armed attack unless it rises to a sufficient 
level of gravity, even if the target is itself a military unit; (3) 
satisfying the necessity requirement of the doctrine of self-defense 
demands some sort of complaint by the defending state to the 
attacking state, even if there is good reason to doubt that the 
complaint would have any effect; and (4) the proportionality of an 
action taken in self-defense is evaluated by a comparison to the 
action to which it was a response, not by comparing it to the 
danger the defending state seeks to avoid.  These conclusions have 
been criticized as misstating the law.166  For present purposes, what 
is important is that the Court made no reference to any state 
practice in reading the foregoing limitations into what it 
apparently considered the CIL rules regarding self-defense, 
indeed, it did not make clear the source of those limitations. 
The Wall Case167 was another in which many of the Court’s 
conclusions were based on doubtful sources.  That case addressed 
Israel’s construction of a barrier (the wall) intended to block 
infiltration by terrorists across Israel’s de facto 1967 eastern border 
(the Green Line) from the occupied Palestinian territories.168  The 
Court stated in the opinion that 
[T]he rules and principles of international law which are 
relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel . . . 
can be found in the United Nations Charter and certain other 
treaties, in customary international law and in the relevant 
resolutions adopted pursuant to the Charter by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council.169 
Since General Assembly Resolutions are not legally binding, 
this statement makes explicit that the Court was relying on sources 
hard to reconcile with Article 38. The Court grounded its assertion 
that international law renders illegal any acquisition of territory by 
force on the Charter, a General Assembly resolution, and language 
from Nicaragua, Merits.170  To support the statement that the right 
 
 166  See, e.g., Taft, supra note 10, at 299–306 (analyzing the elements of self-
defense in international law). 
 167 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion (Wall Case), 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
 168 Id. at 166–70. 
 169 Id. at 171. 
 170 Id. 
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to self-determination is a right erga omnes, relied on Articles 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights171 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,172 
the Charter, a second General Assembly resolution, and three of its 
decisions.173  It relied on a judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal 
and one of its decisions in holding that the Hague Regulations of 
1907174 had passed into customary international law.175  To support 
its conclusion that the Fourth Geneva Convention176 applied in the 
Palestinian territories, the Court once again cited its own cases for 
the proposition that Article 31 of the Treaties Convention had 
passed into customary international law, and on the travaux 
préparatoires of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a resolution of a 
meeting of the parties to that convention, a statement by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), various 
General Assembly and Security Resolutions, and a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Israel.177  (Oddly, the Court justified its reliance 
on the ICRC’s interpretation of the Fourth Convention by reference 
to language in Article 142 of that treaty which provides, “[t]he 
special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 
this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.”178  That 
article, however, refers only to access by relief societies to 
protected persons; it does not address the ICRC’s competence to 
interpret the Convention.)179  The court relied on the practice of the 
Human Rights Committee (the monitoring body established by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and on the 
travaux préparatoires of that instrument in holding that the 
 
 171 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 172  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 173 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171–72. 
 174 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631. 
 175 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 172. 
 176 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention). 
 177 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171–77. 
 178 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 176, art. 142. 
 179 Id. 
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provisions of the Covenant apply in territory under the control of a 
party to the Covenant as a matter of belligerent occupation.180 
Finally, the Court considered the possibility that Israel had 
available the defense of necessity; that proposition, too, was 
rejected.  The Court, relying on its own decision which citied a 
draft by the International Law Commission, asserted that a state 
may not rely on a plea of necessity unless the action taken is “the 
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril.”181  The Court maintained that it was, 
“not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route 
chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel 
against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that 
construction.”182 
Several of the rules the Court labeled CIL in this case183 do not 
seem to satisfy the state practice requirement in Article 38 of the 
I.C.J. Statute.  Indeed, at no point in its opinion did it make any 
reference to actual state practice other than in its citation to the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s opinion in connection with the 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  It did, however, 
cite repeatedly to General Assembly resolutions, determinations by 
the Human Rights Committee and the International Law 
Commission, and once to a determination by the ICRC.184  While 
some of these bodies might count as subsidiary sources of law, no 
legal instrument grants any of them the authority to make rules 
binding in international law.  The Court did not address the fact 
that one of these bodies—the International Law Commission—has 
expressed doubts about the competence of bodies such as the 
Human Rights Committee to definitively interpret the treaties they 
monitor, at least in the context of evaluating treaty reservations.185 
 
 180 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 177–80. 
 181 Id. at 194–95. 
 182 Id. at 195.  Though not really relevant to this discussion, it is impossible 
not to note that the discussion of the necessarily fact-specific issue of Israel’s 
necessity argument is surprisingly brief and conclusory. 
 183 Id. at 171–73. 
 184 Id. at 171–79. 
 185 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rapport de la Commission du droit international, sur les 
travaux de sa quarante-neuvième session, 12 mai–18 juillet 1997 [Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-ninth Session, 12 May–18 July 
1997], 107, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997). 
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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Uganda)186 (DRC v. Uganda) also raises issues of the 
Court’s reliance on sources not mentioned in Article 38.  The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) sought relief from the 
presence of Ugandan troops in its territory after August 1998, 
when the DRC had allegedly ceased to consent to what had 
admittedly begun as a consensual presence.  The DRC further 
alleged various human rights violations and other war crimes 
committed by Ugandan forces.  Uganda claimed that, in the period 
between 1994 and 1997, the DRC was supporting anti-Uganda 
rebel groups based in the territory of the DRC and carrying out 
attacks in Ugandan territory, and that DRC support for such 
groups resumed in 1998.  Uganda therefore asserted that its 
operations in the territory of the Congo were matters of lawful self-
defense.  Uganda also counter-claimed against the DRC, asserting 
that the DRC had violated its duty of vigilance by tolerating the 
operations of anti-Ugandan armed groups on Congolese 
territory.187 
The Court held that a state’s obligations under human rights 
treaties apply to territory over which it acquired control during the 
course of an armed conflict.  The Court relied solely on its own 
decision in the Wall case188 to support this proposition, not even 
considering the language of the human rights treaties that it 
deemed applicable.189 
The Court also gave a doubtfully sourced response to the 
DRC’s assertion that Uganda’s alleged pillaging of the Congo’s 
natural resources was a violation of the principle that a state enjoys 
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources.  The Court 
agreed that this principle was a matter of customary international 
law, but relied solely on several General Assembly resolutions as 
support for that conclusion,190 despite the lack of binding legal 
effect in General Assembly resolutions. 
 
 186 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Dec. 19, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 271, 280–284 (2006). 
 187 Id. at 329. 
 188 Id. at 317, para. 216 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178–81 
(July 9)). 
 189 Id. at 317–18. 
 190 Id. at 322–23. 
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Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Merits191 (Genocide Case) was another case in which the 
Court chose to rely on its own decisions as authority even in the 
face of counter-arguments.  Bosnia and Herzegovina originally 
brought this case in 1993, alleging that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (“FRY”), which became Serbia and Montenegro, was 
responsible for committing genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.192  
The CIL issue arose when the Court had to determine the standard 
to evaluate the degree of control Serbia and Montenegro exercised 
over groups found to have perpetrated genocide.  Thereafter, the 
court could determine whether the genocide could be attributed to 
Serbia and Montenegro.193  In Nicaragua, the Court held that the 
acts of groups could be attributed to a state only if it exercised 
“effective control” of the groups, that is, if it “directed or enforced 
the perpetration” of the particular acts at issue.194  However, as the 
ICJ noted, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) applied a different standard in Prosecutor v. 
Tadić.195 
In Tadić, the standard for evaluating the defendant’s conduct 
depended on the applicability of a particular treaty, which only 
applied if the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be considered 
“international.”  Classifying the conflict as international depended 
on whether the acts of Bosnian-Serb military forces could be 
attributed to the FRY (as it then was).  The ICTY acknowledged 
that the Court’s “effective control” test had not been satisfied.  It 
held, however, that the effective control test was not the proper 
legal standard for evaluating the connection between a 
government and a military unit not part of the state structure, 
holding instead the conduct of the unit could be attributed to the 
state so long as the state was in “overall control” of the unit—that 
is, so long as the state provided financing, equipment, and 
 
 191 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Feb. 26, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 188, 
288 (2007) (Genocide Case). 
 192 Id. at 190. 
 193 Id. at 286–87. 
 194 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64–65 
(June 27). 
 195 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals 
Chamber, ¶ 112 (July 15, 1999). 
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participated in the planning and supervision of military 
operations.196  Most important was the mode of analysis employed 
by the ICTY.  It first considered the logic of the concept of 
attribution, noting that states were responsible for even ultra vires 
conduct of their organs, and observing that, for attribution 
purposes, an organized, hierarchically structured group could be 
analogized more reasonably to a state organ than to an individual, 
for whom a more demanding attribution standard might be 
appropriate.197  The ICTY next examined in detail decisions by 
three international tribunals and one from the German courts (such 
a decision being a form of German state practice) which attributed 
state acts of hierarchically structured groups to the “overall 
control” standard.198 
In addressing the difference between its standard and that of 
the ICTY, the Court took note of the formulation on State 
Responsibility in the International Law Commission’s Articles to 
the effect that the acts of persons or groups are attributed to a state 
if the person or group is “acting . . . under the direction or control 
of” the state.  The issue, however, was defining “control.”  After 
citing this language, the Court rejected the ICTY’s standard 
because “it stretch[ed] too far, almost to the breaking point, the 
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s 
organs and its international responsibility.”199  The Court did not 
explain why it reached this conclusion; it simply asserted it.  
Likewise, the Court did not acknowledge that the commentary on 
the relevant portion of the Articles on State Responsibility takes 
note of both the Nicaragua and Tadić cases, but does not choose 
between them.200  Nor did the ICJ engage the arguments made by 
the ICTY, including the arguments drawn from judicial decisions 
and state practice.  We are left, therefore, with nothing more than 




 196 Id. ¶ 145. 
 197 Id. ¶¶ 119, 121. 
 198 Id. ¶¶ 124–31. 
 199 Genocide Case, 46 I.L.M. at 286–88. 
 200 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its Fifty-third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, 103–09, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001). 
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2.1.6. CIL Cases - Rule Applied Contradicted by Significant State 
Practice 
In four cases decided during this period, the Court’s judgment 
relied on a rule of law contradicted by significant state practice.  It 
is important to stress that the practice to which the Court appeared 
unwilling to give weight was not sporadic or attributable to low-
level government officials, but frequent and the consequence of 
decisions by the highest level of government. 
Two of these cases were the decisions involving the United 
States and Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction 
and Admissability201 (Nicaragua, Jurisdiction) and Nicaragua, Merits.202  
Nicaragua alleged in its application that the United States was 
responsible for certain unlawful uses of force against it.  As noted 
above,203 the ICJ’s analysis in these judgments was and remains 
quite controversial.  Accordingly, they will require some 
discussion. 
In Nicaragua, Jurisdiction, the Court addressed arguments made 
by the United States against the ICJ’s jurisdiction over Nicaragua’s 
claims against it.  The elements of the Court’s analysis depended 
very little on state practice.  One exception, however, concerned an 
element of the instrument by which the United States had accepted 
the court’s so-called compulsory jurisdiction. 
In that instrument, the United States excluded from its consent 
certain disputes arising under multilateral treaties.204  The United 
States argued that, since Nicaragua based its claims in part on the 
United Nations Charter, the case fell into the class of excluded 
disputes.205  The Court rejected this argument, observing that 
Nicaragua had also based its claims on allegations of violations of 
customary international law and “[p]rinciples such as those of the 
non-use of force, non-intervention, respect for the independence 
 
 201 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1984 I.C.J. 392, 421–23 (Nov. 26) (Nicaragua, Jurisdiction). 
 202 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 16 (June 
27). 
 203 See supra text accompanying notes 6–10 (citing commentators’ negative 
reactions and strong criticism of the court’s decisions in Nicaragua, Merits, the 
Wall Case, and Oil Platform). 
 204 Nicaragua, Jurisdiction, 1984 I.C.J. at 421–23. 
 205 Id. at 422. 
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and territorial integrity of States and the freedom of navigation, 
continue to be binding as part of customary international 
law . . .”206  While this assertion presumably must be understood to 
mean that the Court saw these principles as representing the 
general practice of states, it did not explicitly address the question 
of whether the state practice in fact conformed to those principles.  
Rather, it simply asserted their character as customary law. 
This argument was also crucial to the Court’s Judgment in 
Nicaragua, Merits,207 aspects of which have already been addressed.  
The Court in that case repeated its assertion that Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter, forbidding “the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,”208 was a 
rule of customary international law.209  But the Court cited no state 
practice whatever supporting this conclusion.  While the Court 
argued that the opinio juris supporting this proposition of law had 
to be established and attempted to do so, it did not analyze state 
practice.  Furthermore, in attempting to establish opinio juris, the 
Court relied on a number of doubtful sources.210  These included 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the support of the United 
States for non-binding resolutions adopted by other bodies, the 
language of a treaty to which the United States was a party, 
frequent statements by state representatives, the work of the ILC, 
and statements by both of the parties in their memorials that the 
rule was one of jus cogens.211  The Court’s use of statements from 
both parties’ memorials is somewhat confusing in light of the 
Court’s earlier insistence that it was obliged to determine the law 
on this subject independent of the parties’ positions.212  The Court 
also relied on the Declaration on Friendly Relations as establishing 
the grounds for legal distinctions between uses of force 
constituting armed attacks and those which are less serious, and 
reinforcing the argument that armed intervention by one state in 
the internal affairs of a second state is a violation of a customary 
rule213—indeed, its focus on the language of this non-binding 
 
 206 Id. at 424, para. 73. 
 207 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 93–94. 
 208 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 209  Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 99–100. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 100–01. 
 212 Id. at 97–98. 
 213 Id. at 101–02. 
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resolution in this context is hard to distinguish from what would 
be expected if the Court were construing a treaty. 
By characterizing the foregoing actions as establishing a CIL 
rule, the Court effectively attributed no legal effect to states’ 
interventions in the internal affairs of other states, a type of action 
which took place frequently during the 1970’s and 1980’s; one 
count showed 18 such interventions.214  The Court acknowledged 
this fact, stating that “there have been in recent years a number of 
instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces opposed 
to the government of another state.”215  However, the Court 
proffered two reasons for according no legal significance to these 
interventions.  First, it stated that it “is not concerned here with the 
process of decolonization; this question is not at issue in the 
present case.”216  The implication, of course, is that there is some 
legally relevant distinction between interventions in aid of 
decolonization and all others, such that the latter can be considered 
without reference to the former.  The Court, however, did not 
explain the basis of any such distinction. 
The Court offered a second reason for disregarding the 
interventions to which it referred: the intervening states offered no 
legal rationale for their behavior.217  Citing its opinion in North Sea 
Continental Shelf,218 the court asserted that practice was not enough 
to establish a new rule of customary law.  Also required was 
“evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it.  The need for such a belief, 
i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very 
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.”219 
In the case of interventions, however, “States had not justified 
their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or to a 
new exception to the principle of its prohibition.”220  According to 
the Court, the United States, in particular, had justified its actions 
 
 214 A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD 
WAR II 120–28, 139–41, 143–50, 152–66, 179–82, 184–86, 188–96, 198–202, 203–06, 
226–40 (1997). 
 215 Id. at 108. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 108–10. 
 218 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
 219 Id. at 44 (internal citation omitted), quoted in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 109. 
 220  Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 109. 
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regarding Nicaragua in statements of policy; it had not asserted 
new rules of international law.221  Therefore, the Court held that 
such interventions and therefore the actions of the United States 
toward Nicaragua, were unlawful.222 
Since part of the purpose of this Article is to examine the 
quality of the ICJ’s decisions, it is important to note several crucial 
flaws in its reasoning on this point.  In the first place, its approach 
assumed the existence of the rule against intervention, and 
asserted that the evidence was insufficient to permit the conclusion 
that the rule had changed; the more basic question, however, was 
whether the rule on which the Court relied had ever come into 
existence, in light of contrary state practice, or, if it had, whether it 
continued to exist.  Second, the Court’s approach did not 
distinguish between the evidence required to demonstrate the 
existence of a restriction on state freedom—the issue in the North 
Sea Case223—and that necessary to show the absence of any such 
restriction.  Finally, the Court was clearly incorrect in its assertion 
that states engaged in interventions in the affairs of other states 
had never offered legal justifications for their actions.224 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 109–10, 118–19, 124. 
 223 See North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J.  at 3 (discussing whether 
customary international law obliged Germany to accept an equidistance line as 
the method of delimiting the boundaries between its continental shelf and those of 
its neighbors). 
 224 France intervened in Gabon in 1964 to suppress a military coup, justifying 
its action by reference to a mutual defense treaty between the two states 
addressing internal as well as external defense.  See WEISBURD, supra note 214, at 
219.  After the intervention by the United States in the midst of the civil disorder 
in the Dominican Republic beginning in April, 1965, Lyndon Johnson, then 
President of the United States, strongly endorsed the principle of non-intervention 
by states into the internal affairs of other states; however, he defended the 
Dominican intervention in part by relying on a 1962 resolution of an organ of the 
Organization of American States and also by characterizing interventions aimed 
at preventing the establishment of Communist governments in the Western 
Hemisphere as an exception to the non-intervention principle.  Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Statement of President Johnson (May 2, 1965), reprinted in DEP’T. ST. 
BULL., May 17, 1965, at 744, 746–47.  That is, he did not simply misrepresent the 
actions the United States had taken.  Again, in November, 1968, after the Warsaw 
Pact states had invaded Czechoslovakia the previous August in order to replace 
that country’s liberal Communist government,  WEISBURD, supra note 214, at 224–
26, Leonid Breznhev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, defended the invasion in a speech arguing that, notwithstanding the 
general rule that interventions in internal affairs were unlawful, international law 
as understood by the Soviet Union allowed interventions undertaken to prevent 
the weakening of the socialist system.  Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary, 
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In its two Nicaragua judgments, then, the ICJ was unwilling to 
accord state practice the status apparently required by Article 38 in 
analyses of CIL, preferring to rely on sources of law not mentioned 
in Article 38 and not binding on their own terms.225 
The Court also ignored relevant practice in three other cases.  
As noted above,226 the Court in the Oil Platforms Case227 applied a 
very stringent test for determining whether the United States could 
rely on the defenses of self-defense and necessity with respect to its 
attacks on Iranian oil platforms. However, the Court did not 
inquire whether the response of the United States and the United 
Nations to the attacks of September 11, 2001 had any bearing on 
the content of the law of self-defense.228  Since Security Council 
decisions are legally binding on all U.N. members, Council 
resolutions would appear to be a very important type of state 
practice.  Yet the Court in Oil Platforms did not address Security 
Council Resolution 1378,229 which apparently endorses the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime as a response to the September 11 
 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Speech before the fifth Congress of the 
Polish United Workers Party (Nov. 13, 1968). 
 225 Beyond these points, there is reason to wonder whether the Court was 
entirely unbiased in its consideration of this case.  For example, it rejected the 
argument that El Salvador had in fact sought the assistance of the United States in 
defending itself as early as 1981, despite a clear statement to that effect in the 
Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 
215, and despite the absence of evidence to the contrary.  See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 87-88, 120-22 (June 27).  However, the Court 
refused to credit American assertions that the government of Nicaragua was 
supporting the groups seeking to overthrow the government of El Salvador, at 
least in part simply because Nicaragua denied the assertion, despite evidence 
supporting the American claims, id. at 78–79.  More seriously, according to Judge 
Schwebel, in December, 1984, after the Court had rendered its judgment in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities, but before the withdrawal of the United States 
from its participation in the matter, then-President Elias not only gave an 
interview in which he commented on this pending case, but in the interview 
expressly criticized various aspects of the foreign policy of the United States, 
Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 314–15 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); 
in his separate opinion, Judge Elias acknowledged the accuracy of Judge 
Schwebel’s account of the interview.  Id. at 179–80 (separate opinion of Judge 
Elias). 
 226 See supra text accompanying notes 162–67. 
 227 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 189, 191–92, 195–96 (Nov. 6). 
 228 Professor Murphy stresses the importance of the Security Council 
resolutions adopted in response to those attacks as a measure of states’ 
understanding of the scope of the right of self-defense.  See Murphy, supra note 10, 
at 67–70. 
 229 S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
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attacks230 and thus provides at least some guidance as to states’ 
understanding of the meaning of proportionality and necessity in 
the context of self-defense.  This raises particular difficulties 
because the Court’s apparent assumption that the proportionality 
of a defensive response is to be measured against the act 
prompting the resort to self-defense, rather than according to the 
extent of the future danger the defending state seeks to prevent, is 
hard to square with Resolution 1378. 
The Court also ignored relevant practice in the advisory 
opinion in the Wall Case,231 when it held illegal, as a matter of 
customary law, both the seizure of territory by force and the denial 
of the right of self-determination.  This holding is problematic 
because it is difficult to reconcile with the facts of East Timor.232  
That case arose after Indonesia seized East Timor by force and 
subsequently annexed it, and after the rest of the world essentially 
acquiesced in that seizure, despite initially characterizing it as 
violating the right to self-determination. 233  This pattern of events 
would seem to undercut any argument as to the character of CIL as 
the principles the Court applied, but the Wall opinion makes no 
reference to international reaction to Indonesia’s actions in East 
Timor. 
DRC v. Uganda234 is another case in which the Court applied 
purported CIL rules at least arguably inconsistent with state 
practice.  One such situation arose from the Court’s dealing with 
the DRC’s claims turning on the relationship between Uganda and 
certain Congolese groups rebelling against the government of the 
DRC.  The Court concluded that, while Uganda had given training 
and military support to such groups, it had not controlled them.  
The Court, however, took note of language in the General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Relations235 to the effect that 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or 
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized 
 
 231 Id. pmbl., paras. 2, 4. 
 231 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
 232 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30). 
 233 Id. at 103–05. 
 234 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271, 307 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
 235 Id. at 308. 
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activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.236 
and that “no State shall organize, assist, foment, [or] finance . . . 
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the 
regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State.”237 
The Court held that this language stated customary 
international law, citing no authority for that proposition, and 
relying only on its own decision in Nicaragua for the rule that the 
implication of this language is to forbid external support for 
internal opposition groups.  The Court therefore concluded that 
Uganda’s support for anti-government Congolese forces violated 
international law.238  As it had done in Nicaragua, the Court placed 
no weight on the widespread practice of intervention; indeed, in 
DRC v. Uganda, it did not even acknowledge the fact of such 
interventions. 
A second similar problem in this case was presented by 
Uganda’s counterclaims.  One of those counter-claims was based 
on the DRC’s alleged lack of vigilance in tolerating the operations 
of anti-Uganda guerillas on the Congo’s territory.  That claim was 
based on the same elements of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations that the Court cited as supporting the customary law rule 
forbidding states to so much as tolerate actions within their 
borders amounting to interference in the affairs of other states, and 
the Court acknowledged as much.  It held, however, that the DRC 
was not responsible for “tolerating” the activities of these groups 
because of its practical inability to control the areas where they 
operated.239  The Court cited no state practice supporting such a 
limitation on the prohibition on which Uganda relied, failing once 
again to mention the post-September 11 Security Council 
resolutions;240 those resolutions, dealing as they do with a state’s 
 
 236 Id. at 308. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 308. 
 239 Uganda was, thus, in the strange position of being forbidden to use force 
against insurgent groups as a matter of self-defense because their actions were not 
attributable to the DRC, see supra notes 285–86 and accompanying text.  Uganda 
was also unable to hold the DRC responsible for failing to suppress these groups 
because of the weakness of the DRC government. 
 240 Id. 
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responsibility for the actions of powerful groups operating from 
within its territory, were at least relevant state practice, and 
arguably inconsistent with the Court’s result. 
Finally, the Diallo Case241 presents an interesting twist on the 
Court’s failure to confront contrary authority.  In that case, the 
Court derived its definition of “diplomatic protection”242 from the 
ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.243  Draft article 11 
discusses the question of diplomatic protection of a corporation 
incorporated in the allegedly wrongdoing state, the shares of 
which are owned by nationals of the protecting state.  The article 
provides that the protecting state may provide such protection if 
the incorporation was required as a condition of doing business.244  
In the Commentary to that article, however, the ILC makes the case 
that such protection is allowed even if the incorporation was not 
required as a precondition to doing business, noting that its draft 
takes a position more conservative than is recognized in practice.245  
The Court’s opinion essentially rejects the reasoning of the ILC 
commentary, but does not acknowledge that its conclusion is at 
odds with the ILC’s reasoning; it mentions draft article 11 only to 
note that the case was not one where local incorporation was 
forced on a foreign national.246 
2.2. Treaties 
Any discussion of the relationship between state practice and 
treaty interpretation must start with Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Article 31 provides, in relevant 
part: 
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
 
 241 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712. 
 242 Id. 722. 
 243 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth 
Session, 22–65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Diplomatic Protection 
Draft Articles]. 
 244 Id. art. 11(b), at 58. 
 245 Id. at 62–65. 
 246 Diallo, 46 I.L.M. at 733. 
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treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
. . . 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: 
. . . 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation . . . . 247 
That is, according to the Vienna Convention, the practice of 
treaty parties in applying the treaty is not merely a source of 
enlightenment which may be consulted or not, but a piece of 
evidence which must be considered in any case where it is 
available. 
It must be stressed that the Court has repeatedly held that 
Article 31 has passed into CIL, and has relied on it in a number of 
cases.248  For example, in the Nuclear Weapons Case,249 the Court 
relied on the practice of treaty parties in interpreting several 
treaties.  The Court observed that “the pattern”250 regarding treaty 
prohibitions of weapons of mass destruction was for such weapons 
to be prohibited by specific instruments and noting that certain 
treaties asserted to make the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
illegal contained no such specific prohibition of those weapons.251  
The Court also held that certain treaties addressed specifically to 
 
 247 Treaties Convention, supra note 16, art 31. 
 248 See Border and Transborder Armed Action: Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Admissibility of the Application (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 ICJ 69, 87–88 (Dec. 20) 
(regarding a multilateral treaty); Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 51–52 (June 14) (involving 
a bilateral treaty); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
38 (Sept. 25) (bilateral treaty); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 
1045, 1059, 1075–76 (Dec. 13) (bilateral treaty); Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan 
and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 645–46, 656–65 (Dec. 17) 
(bilateral treaty); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9) (multilateral treaty). 
 249 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
 250 Id. at 248. 
 251 See id. at 248–49 (contrasting the treatment of nuclear weapons with that of 
other weapons of mass destruction). 
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nuclear weapons could not be read to prohibit their possession or 
use.  It based this conclusion in part on the language of those 
treaties, but also relied on the failure of treaty parties to object to 
certain reservations propounded by states possessing nuclear 
weapons, and on the Security Council’s approval of the entire 
arrangement.252 
The Court has even based interpretations of instruments 
accepting its jurisdiction and of its Statute on state practice.  In 
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), (Preliminary Objections),253 Nigeria’s 
preliminary objections included the assertion that there was no 
basis for a judicial determination regarding certain issues because 
Cameroon’s submissions to the Court were so lacking in necessary 
details that Nigeria was unable to frame a reply to those 
submissions, because the Court would be unable to resolve the 
questions raised by those submissions, and because an applicant 
state was essentially restricted to arguments based on whatever 
allegations were set out in its application, with only limited scope 
for subsequent expansion.  Cameroon responded that it intended 
to provide additional details in the course of the litigation and was 
free to do so under the rules of the Court.254 
The Court rejected Nigeria’s preliminary objection, relying in 
part on the implications of its own decisions.  It also relied, 
however, on what it called “an established practice for States 
submitting an application to the Court to reserve the right to 
present additional facts and legal considerations.”255 
In Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction, 256 the 
Court’s jurisdiction depended on whether a reservation to 
Canada’s acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
deprived the Court of jurisdiction in the case.  The reservation 
excluded from its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction “disputes arising out of or concerning conservation 
 
 252 Id. at 248–53. 
 253 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 
v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11). 
 254 See id. at 317–18 (detailing the claims made by both Nigeria and Cameroon 
with respect to Nigeria’s Sixth Preliminary Objection). 
 255 Id. at 318. 
 256 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4). 
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and management measures taken by Canada with respect to 
vessels fishing in [a designated ocean area].”257 
In its analysis of this question, the Court determined that the 
crucial issue was the meaning of the term “conservation and 
management measures” as used in the reservation, and that the 
phrase should be given the meaning the meaning it had in 
international law.258  To determine this meaning, the Court relied 
on state practice, which it recounted with great specificity.  In 
particular, it cited two international multilateral conventions, three 
regional multilateral conventions, two bilateral conventions and 
the domestic law of Algeria, Argentina, the Malagasy Republic, 
New Zealand and the European Economic Community.259 
Finally, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction in Aerial 
Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction,260 because, 
among other reasons, India had interposed a reservation to the 
instrument whereby it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court.261  In the course of reaching this conclusion, the court cited 
the practice of states in attaching such reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction as 
demonstrating the permissibility of such reservations.262 
However, the Court has not been consistent in its willingness to 
rely on the state practice of treaty parties as an element of treaty 
interpretation.  In LaGrand (Germany v. United States),263 it ignored 
state practice regarding the interpretation of its statute.  The case 
was the result of the violation by the United States of its 
obligations to Germany under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (“Consular Convention”).264  Specifically, Germany 
alleged and the United States conceded that state authorities in 
 
 257 Id. at 457 (citation omitted). 
 258 See id. at 458–63 (detailing the Spanish argument that a more restrictive 
interpretation of “conservation and management measures” should be adopted 
and the Canadian argument for a more expansive interpretation). 
 259 See id. at 461 (reviewing the usage of “conservation and management 
measures” and similar terms across a variety of international conventions and the 
domestic laws of Algeria, Argentina, the Malagasy Republic, New Zealand and 
the European Economic Community). 
 260 Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21). 
 261 Id. at 25–32. 
 262 Id. at 30. 
 263 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
 264 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261[hereinafter Consular Convention]. 
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Arizona had failed to comply with the obligation under the 
Consular Convention265 to inform two German nationals, the 
LaGrand brothers, of their right to consult the German consul after 
they were arrested for a 1982 murder.266  The LaGrands were 
convicted and sentenced to death in 1984.  Upon learning of the 
treaty breach in 1992, they unsuccessfully sought relief in 
American courts, including the Supreme Court.  Karl LaGrand was 
executed as scheduled on February 24, 1999.  On March 2, 1999, 
Germany filed its application with the ICJ, requesting provisional 
measures, including an order to the effect that the United States 
“should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter 
LaGrand was not executed” before the Court rendered judgment in 
the case, Walter’s execution having been scheduled for March 3.  
The Court issued the order for provisional measures on March 3, 
and both Germany and Walter LaGrand sought relief from the 
United States Supreme Court on that day.  Both were unsuccessful, 
and Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999.267 
In its memorial, the United States argued on a number of 
grounds that provisional measures indicated by the Court imposed 
no binding legal obligation.268  In particular, the United States 
argued that the practice of states respecting such orders 
demonstrates that the parties to the Court’s statute do not read that 
treaty as imposing a legally binding obligation to carry out 
provisional measures.269  The Court, however, concluded that 
orders for provisional measures were indeed legally binding.270  
The court did not address all the American arguments, and did not 
so much as mention the American argument based on state 
 
 265 See id. art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294 (calling for arresting countries to 
inform foreign nationals of their rights without delay). 
 266 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 475 (recounting the charges against the LaGrand 
brothers at the time of their arrest).  There was some dispute between the parties 
as to the time at which the relevant American authorities learned that the 
LaGrands were German nationals, but all agreed that the authorities were aware 
of this fact by late 1984.  See id. at 475–76 (noting the initial confusion surrounding 
the nationality of the LaGrand brothers). 
 267 See id. at 475–79 (recounting the trial and appeals of the LaGrand brothers, 
the German involvement and the subsequent executions). 
 268 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. 
U.S.) (Mar. 27, 2000), paras. 91, 138–65, available at http://www.icj-cij.org 
/docket/files/104/8554.pdf. 
 269 See id. paras. 161–64 (describing several instances where the I.C.J. found 
provisional and interim measures to be non-binding). 
 270 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 506. 
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 271 See id. at 501–06 (addressing the inconsistency between the English and 
French text of Article 41 and comparisons which might be made to illuminate the 
appropriate interpretation).  Parts of the Court’s analysis are surprising.  A crucial 
element of the argument of the United States derived from the language of Article 
41 of the Statute, which in its English version provides, 
1.  The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
2.  Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall 
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council. 
The equally authentic French version provides, 
1. La Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances 
l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être 
prises à titre provisoire. 
2.  En attendant l’arrêt définitif, l’indication de ces mesures est 
immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité ). 
Id. at 501–02.  The United States argued that the measures could not be 
characterized as obligatory since the terms used in the English text to describe the 
issuance of such measures, i.e., “indicate,” “suggested,” were not those lawyers 
would use to create an obligation.  See Counter-Memorial of the United States of 
America, LaGrand, paras. 141–52 (detailing the United States argument regarding 
the English translation).  The Court, however, characterized the word “devoir” 
(infinitive form of the word “doivent”) as “having an imperative character,” 
Lagrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 502.  However, according to LAROUSSE, GRAND DICTIONAIRE 
FRANCAIS-ANGLAIS, ANGLAIS-FRANCAISE 274 (1993 ed.), while the first meaning of 
the verb “devoir,” when translated into English, is “must,” the second meaning is 
“should” or “ought.”  The Court purported to resolve what it saw as a difference 
in meaning between the English and French texts by resort to Article 33(4) of the 
Treaties Convention, supra note 16, which provides, “when a comparison of the 
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 
31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.” Treaties 
Convention, supra note, art 31–32.  Since “devoir” can mean “suggest,” one might 
expect that the Court, seeking to “reconcile the texts” would accept that the two 
versions of Article 41 should in fact be seen as identical and that the Article 
should therefore be read as not creating a binding obligation.  Instead, the Court 
made no effort to reconcile the texts, but leapt to a consideration of the “object and 
purpose” of the Statute, concluding on that basis that Article 41 created a binding 
obligation.  Further, the Court’s consideration of the preparatory work for Article 
41 concluded: 
The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference given in 
the French text to “indiquer” over “ordonner” was motivated by the 
consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the 
execution of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and 
the lack of binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that 
the Court does not itself have the means to ensure the execution of 
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In four cases, the Court failed to give weight to the parties’ 
interpretation of treaties other than its statute.  One of these was 
LaGrand.  The LaGrands had been denied habeas corpus relief in 
U.S. Federal court on the ground that, having failed to raise their 
Consular Convention argument in the earlier state proceedings, 
they had essentially waived the argument—the so-called rule of 
procedural default.  In the ICJ case, Germany argued that 
application of the procedural default rule was a violation of Article 
36.272  The United States asserted that the Article 36 claim was 
inadmissible in that Germany was seeking to hold the United 
States to a standard in the application of that provision stricter than 
that which it followed itself.273  Further, it asserted in its written 
pleadings that, based on investigations by American officials, 
“States Party to the Vienna Convention throughout the world 
operate on the understanding that a criminal proceeding against a 
foreign national can proceed regardless of whether consular 
notification is provided.”274 
The Court rejected both arguments.  As to the admissibility 
argument, the Court distinguished the German cases upon which 
the United States relied as entailing “relatively light criminal 
penalties” and as providing no evidence regarding German 
practice respecting criminal defendants facing severe penalties.  
Acknowledging that the Consular Convention draws no 
distinction in Article 36 between the severity of the penalties faced 
by arrested persons, the Court held that “it does not follow 
therefrom that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be 
identical in all situations.”275  The Court simply did not respond to 
the United States’s argument regarding state practice with respect 
to the proper interpretation of Article 36; it rejected the United 
 
orders made pursuant to Article 41 is not an argument against the 
binding nature of such orders. 
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 505.  In other words, since the Court disagreed with the 
reasons the drafters of the Statute gave for refraining from making Article 41 
mandatory, it chooses to disregard clear evidence that, as far as the drafters were 
concerned, it was not mandatory. 
 272 Id. at 488. 
 273 Id. at 496–97. 
 274 Counter-Memorial of the United States, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2000 
I.C.J, para. 91. 
 275 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 489. 
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States’s reading of that Article based solely on its exegesis of the 
language of the treaty.276 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 
America),277 another Consular Convention case, presented a similar 
situation.  One element of Mexico’s claim was that the Vienna 
Convention was properly interpreted as requiring the United 
States to inform foreign nationals of their Convention rights as 
soon as they were detained.278  As in LaGrand, the United States’s 
argument against this position depended in part on a detailed 
examination of the practice of states in implementing Article 36.279  
As it did with a similar American argument in LaGrand,280 the 
Court simply ignored the argument based on state practice in 
considering the issue, though it rejected Mexico’s claim on other 
grounds.281  It only addressed this point obliquely, in the course of 
rejecting the American argument that Mexico’s claim was 
inadmissible because it was seeking to impose on the United States 
a standard which its own behavior did not satisfy.282 
The Wall Case presents a similar problem because of the Court’s 
rejection of Israel’s argument based on Article 51 of the Charter.  
Article 51 was irrelevant both because, according to the Court, 
Article 51 applies only to self-defense against attacks attributable to 
another state, which was not the case with respect to the attacks of 
which Israel complained, and because the attacks originated from 
areas under Israel’s occupation.  This latter point, again according 
to the Court, rendered irrelevant the Security Council resolutions 
condemning terrorism adopted in the wake of the attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001.  In fact, those resolutions 
amount to state practice undercutting that conclusion.  This is true 
because—although the preambles of both resolutions refer to 
“international peace and security” and/or “international 
terrorism,”—both refer only to “terrorism” in their operative 
 
 276 Id. at 495–98. 
 277 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 
31). 
 278 Id. at 66–67. 
 279 Counter-Memorial for the United States, Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (U.S. Avena Counter-Memorial), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 89–98 
(Mar. 31). 
 280 See supra text accompanying notes 263–67. 
 281 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 67–68. 
 282 Id. at 61. 
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paragraphs,283 and because those resolutions were adopted in 
response to an attack which, from the beginning of the actual 
operation until its end, took place in the territory of the state 
attacked, as Professor Murphy has pointed out.284 
DRC v. Uganda,285 in holding that Article 51 did not permit 
Uganda to use force against anti-Uganda guerillas within DRC 
territory because the acts of those guerrillas could not be attributed 
to the DRC,286 similarly failed to give weight to the post September 
11 Security Council resolutions as relevant state practice. 
2.3. Summary 
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the Court’s 
treatment of state practice has been quite inconsistent regarding 
both the determination of the content of CIL and the interpretation 
of treaties.  To recapitulate the situation regarding CIL, the Court’s 
activity can be broken down into 5 categories: 1) reliance on actual 
state practice as the source of CIL rules; 2) reliance on either 
secondary sources of law (judicial opinions or the writings of 
scholars) or non-binding instruments (e.g., General Assembly 
resolutions, actions of international conferences) as the source of 
rules, even though reliance on state practice would have produced 
the same result; 3) drawing CIL rules from secondary sources of 
law; 4) asserting the existence of rules of CIL without providing 
any basis for the assertion other than doubtful sources; 5) asserting 
 
 283 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (expressing 
sympathy for the U.S. after September 11 and agreeing to continue considering 
the issue of terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) 
(condemning the use of terrorism and directing states to stop funding or 
supporting terrorist organizations and work together to prevent further attacks). 
 284 Murphy, supra note 10, at 68 (discussing the seemingly arbitrary factual 
distinction the ICJ draws between the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United 
States—a result of a threat the ICJ says originated outside U.S. territory—and the 
attacks in Israeli territory, that the ICJ says were entirely domestic).  It is also 
worth noting that the Court’s conclusion that Article 51 applies only to defense 
against attacks imputable to a state has no support in the text of the article, as 
Judge Koojimans noted in his separate opinion in the Wall Case.  Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory 
2004 I.C.J. 136, 1072 (July 9) (Koojimans, J. sep. opin.).  Professor Murphy has also 
pointed out that the classic statement of the parameters of the right of self-defense 
was formulated in the context of an action not attributable to a state.  Murphy, 
supra note 10, at 64–65. 
 285 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
 286 Id. at 306. 
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the existence of rules of CIL drawn from secondary sources and 
non-binding instruments when the asserted rules are actually 
contradicted by significant state practice.  With respect to treaties, 
the Court has invoked the rule that treaties are to be interpreted in 
light of the practice of the treaty parties and has followed this rule 
in some cases.  In others, however, it did not follow the rule; in 
those cases, furthermore, it did not acknowledge the existence 
either of the rule or of the practice of the treaty parties.  In none of 
these cases did the Court explain its choice to proceed in one way 
or another or offer any legal rationale for its different methods of 
analysis. 
The next section turns to an analysis of the Court’s 
performance. 
3. WHAT THE COURT SEEMS TO BE DOING, AND                                          
WHY WE SHOULD CARE 
3.1. What the Court is Doing 
The preceding discussion addressed 27 cases, each offering the 
Court the opportunity to ground its analysis of the relevant law in 
the practice of states, either because the case presented issues of 
CIL or because the case involved a treaty interpretation issue, 
which could have been addressed by considering the practice 
under the treaty of the treaty parties.  Examination of these cases 
makes it possible to see some patterns of arguably problematic 
behavior in the Court’s proceedings.  This Section of the Article 
seeks to identify those patterns.  The following Section addresses 
their legal implications. 
One may, roughly, divide the patterns the cases present into 
two groups: those involving the actions and institutions the Court 
treats as being sources of rules of law, and those involving the 
analytical techniques the Court brings to bear in its consideration 
of these sources.  In treaty cases, the source of the parties’ 
obligations will be uncontroversial—it would be whatever the 
relevant treaty was.  Therefore, the sources question can arise only 
in cases involving CIL.  The issue of analytical techniques, 
however, can arise either in CIL cases or in treaty interpretation 
cases, since, obviously, both present problems of analysis. 
3.1.1. Sources of law 
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The first source of law to consider is state practice, as defined 
above.287  Surprisingly, the Court seems to have paid relatively 
little attention to this source of law.  Only in the Nuclear Weapons 
Case288 did the result turn on the actual practice of states (in that 
case, nuclear deterrence).  The Court did not describe that practice, 
referring only to “the policy of deterrence.”  Since the nature of the 
policy was well-known and, at the time of the decision, only the 
five permanent members of the Security Council admitted to 
possessing nuclear weapons289 the Court’s bare reference to the 
practice was arguably adequate both to describe the sort of activity 
in which states were engaging and to indicate which states were 
acting.  The Court’s description of the practice on which it relied 
nonetheless seems remarkably terse. 
In the other cases in which the Court made reference to state 
practice, its description of that practice was even less specific.  In 
the Continental Shelf Case,290 the Court cited the practice of states in 
holding that the institution of the Exclusive Economic Zone had 
passed into CIL, among other holdings, but did not describe the 
practice, or even indicate the number of states involved.291  It 
further held that use of one particular method of delimitation of 
the continental shelf was shown to be acceptable, albeit not 
mandatory, by the seventy agreements between states delimiting 
their shelves.292  While the Court at least indicated the number of 
instances of practices at issue on this point, it provided no further 
information. 
In the other two cases in which the Court purported to rely on 
state practice to determine the content of CIL, its treatment of CIL 
was even less explicit.  In DRC v. Belgium,293 the Court’s description 
of the state practice on which it relied was non-existent in one part 
 
 287 See discussion, supra Section 2.1.1.  
 288 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 
8). 
 289 It was only in 1996 that India and Pakistan admitted to acquiring those 
weapons.  See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, South Asian Arms Race: Reviving Dormant 
Fears of Nuclear War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at A9. 
 290 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (July 3). 
 291 Id. at 33, 38. 
 292 Id. at 38. 
 293 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 14). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/1
2009] CONCEPT OF STATE PRACTICE 351 
 
of the opinion, and sketchy in the other.294  In the Diallo Case,295 the 
Court described the practice on which the applicant relied, but 
provided very little explanation for its conclusion that the practice 
did not show the existence of a CIL rule.296 
In the foregoing cases, the Court at least purported to rely on 
state practice to establish a CIL rule.  In the remaining CIL cases, 
however, the Court failed to address state practice.  This was most 
surprising in those cases where state practice would have strongly 
supported the result the Court reached.297  In the Gulf of Maine,298 
Continental Shelf,299 and Denmark v. Norway300 judgments, the Court 
made no express mention of the very large numbers of states 
claiming exclusive economic zones, though that practice would 
have supported its purported CIL result.  In Hungary v. Slovakia301 
and the Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion,302 the Court chose to 
rely on the conclusions the ILC had reached regarding certain rules 
of CIL, rather than on the practice, which had been carefully 
described by the ILC, on which those conclusions were based.  And 
in the other CIL cases discussed, the Court either made no 
reference to state practice, or ignored or mischaracterized practice 
contrary to the result it reached.  While some of these cases were 
conventional border disputes, lending themselves to resolution 
through reliance on subsidiary sources of law, others were not.303 
 
 294 Id. at 20–22, 23–24 (discussing “state practice” and “international custom” 
surrounding immunities of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and how the immunity 
applies to allegations of certain crimes such as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity with only minimal references to examples of actual international 
practice). 
 295  Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712. 
 296 Id. paras. 89–90 (concluding that some international agreements, 
provisions in many contracts and certain special cases were not sufficient 
evidence of customary international law). 
 297 See supra text accompanying notes 52–80. 
 298 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case). 
 299 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3) (Continental 
Shelf Case). 
 300 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14) (Denmark v. Norway). 
 301 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) 
(Hungary v. Slovakia). 
 302 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 
62 (Apr. 29) (Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion). 
 303 See supra text accompanying notes 81–233. 
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These results, it should be stressed, cannot be explained as 
flowing from some difficulty the Court has encountered in recent 
decades in determining the content of state practice.  Its careful 
discussion of practice in interpreting the treaty at issue in Spain v. 
Canada304 shows that, when it chose to do so, the Court was capable 
of subjecting practice to very thorough examination. 
It is clear then that what the Court has not been doing in CIL 
cases is basing its judgments on carefully described state practice.  
What is has been doing instead is also significant:  it has been 
relying on international bodies, the governing legal instruments of 
which confer on them no authority to create general obligations in 
international law.  More precisely, the Court has relied, 1) on 
actions by the General Assembly and by states meeting in 
international conferences; 2) on determinations by bodies 
composed of individual experts; and 3) on its own precedents and 
policy determinations.  Each of these categories requires some 
comment. 
The Court expressly relied on General Assembly resolutions to 
support its results in Nicaragua, Merits,305 in the Nuclear Weapons 
Case, 306 in the Wall Case,307 and in DRC v. Uganda.308  Indeed, in 
Hungary v. Slovakia,309 the Court even relied on the General 
Assembly’s adoption of a treaty text as establishing the treaty’s 
provisions as CIL,310 even though the treaty in question was not 
then in force, and in fact has never come into force.311 
 
 304  Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432, 461 (Dec. 4) (Spain v. 
Canada) (tracking the meaning of the term “conservation and management 
measures” from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and a variety of other 
treaties and conventions amongst many European and North American 
countries). 
 305 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) 
(Nicaragua, Merits). 
 306 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 242–43 (July 8) (Nuclear Weapons Case). 
 307 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 171–72, 176 (July 9) (Wall 
Case). 
 308 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 45 I.L.M. 271, 308–09, Dec. 19, 2005 (DRC v. Uganda). 
 309 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) 
(Hungary v. Slovakia). 
 310 Id. at 56. 
 311 See, International Water Law Project, Status of the Convention, 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status
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The Court based its judgment on the work of international 
conferences in a number of cases.  The Court relied on the work of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea—even 
as it acknowledged that the treaty the Conference had produced 
had not yet gone into force—in the Gulf of Maine Case,312 the 
Continental Shelf Case,313 and Denmark v. Norway.314  Similarly, in 
Nicaragua, Merits, the Court characterized the acceptance by the 
United States of certain non-binding resolutions at international 
conferences as demonstrating opinio juris regarding a principle of 
CIL. 
The Court, as noted above, also relied on the work of certain 
expert bodies, such as the ILC315 and the Human Rights 
Committee,316 as sources for rules of law.  Certainly, the 
individuals who compose such bodies would count as falling 
among those “highly qualified publicists” whose work the Statute 
of the Court describes as subsidiary means for determining the 
content of international law.  In that sense, there is more basis for 
reliance on their pronouncements than for reliance on actions by 
the General Assembly or international conferences.  Even here, 
however, the Court’s approach has been curious.  It does not 
appear to have treated the work of such bodies as subsidiary 
means of determining the content of international law, but rather 
as having the same force as other sources mentioned in Article 38.  
For example, in the Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion,317 the Court 
referred to the ILC’s draft Articles on State responsibility,318 but not 
to the state practice on which those articles were based and which 
 
.html (last visited Dec, 3, 2009) (tracking the very limited number of states that 
have signed and ratified the Watercourse Convention, as of Nov. 28, 2009). 
 312 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12) (Gulf of Maine Case). 
 313 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13, 40–41 (June 3). 
 314 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 62 (June 14) (Denmark v. Norway). 
 315 See Gabčíkovo -Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 72 
(Sept. 25) (Hungary v. Slovakia); Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal 
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29) (Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion). 
 316 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9) (Wall Case). 
 317 Special Rapporteur Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. at 87. 
 318 Id. at 87. 
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was described in the ILC’s commentary to its draft.319  Yet if the 
works of publicists are subsidiary to state practice, one would 
expect the court to rely on the primary rather than on the 
subsidiary source, especially when the primary source was easily 
available.320  A particularly striking  example of the Court’s 
attempts to justify reliance on expert bodies is presented by the 
Court’s justification, in the Wall Case, for citing a declaration by the 
ICRC interpreting the Fourth Geneva Convention.  The Court 
quoted an article of that treaty apparently to support the argument 
that the Committee’s treaty interpretations were authoritative;321 
however, read in context, the article clearly refers to other issues 
entirely.322 
Finally, the Court has relied on its own decisions as authority 
supporting particular propositions of law.  Now, in one sense, this 
cannot be surprising.  If the Court has examined a legal issue once, 
it would be a waste of time for the Court to exhaustively re-analyze 
the issue in future cases, all things being equal.  The difficulty 
arises in cases where all things are not equal, that is, when there 
have been legally relevant developments subsequent to a decision 
by the Court which could, at least, require a result different from 
that the Court originally reached.  For example, as discussed 
above,323 the Court in the Genocide Casefollowed Nicaragua, Merits 
in its approach to determining whether a government was 
responsible for the acts of armed groups. 324  It referred to no 
authority besides its own decision and that of the ICTY in the Tadić 
Case325 in addressing the issue.  Yet there had, during the period 
between the two decisions, been a number of incidents of state 
 
 319 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its Twenty-fifth Session 7 May–13 July, 1973, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/9010/REV.1 (1973), 
reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L COMM’N 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973. 
 320 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), May 24, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 712, 
para. 39.  The Court relied on an ILC draft for a definition of the term “diplomatic 
protection”—a definition so uncontroversial as, arguably, requiring no supporting 
authority at all. 
 321 Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 176. 
 322 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 176, art. 142. 
 323 See supra text accompanying notes 173–90. 
 324 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 188, 248 (Feb. 26) 
(Genocide Case). 
 325 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
(July 15, 1999). 
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practice arguably relevant to the issue.326  Since the issue was one 
of CIL, it would seem that the Court could have been expected to 
examine these instances of practice subsequent to Nicaragua, Merits 
to assure itself that this more recent practice did not require 
modification of the views it had expressed in that case.  It did not 
do so, however—in essence treating its decision and that of the 
ICTY as the only sources of law it needed to consider. 
In addition to relying on its own decisions as precedent, the 
Court has also explicitly justified results on the basis of its own, 
independent policy analysis.  In DRC v. Belgium,327 the basis for the 
Court’s decision was its conclusion regarding the policy difficulties 
which it asserted would be created if Belgium were to be allowed 
to go ahead with its criminal proceedings.328  Similarly, in the 
Genocide Case, the Court rejected the attribution standard urged by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina because of what the Court saw as the practical 
difficulties that standard would create.329 
3.1.2. Analytical Technique 
The foregoing discussion addressed arguably problematic 
approaches to sources of law the Court has employed over the 
period under examination.  This portion of the discussion focuses 
on the methods of analysis that seem to raise questions. 
The first of these analytical problems is the lack of transparency 
in the Court’s opinions.  In a surprising number of cases, the Court 
has asserted the existence of a particular rule of law without 
explaining how it has come to conclude that the rule is a rule, even 
though the existence of the rule is by no means uncontroversial.  
There are a number of examples. 
In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Court based its analysis of CIL in 
part on actions taken at the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, rather than on the practice of a very large 
number of states; while the Court stressed the degree of consensus 
at the Conference and the acceptance of the principle in question 
by the United States, despite overall American objections to 
UNCLOS, it did not explain why these elements created a rule of 
 
 326 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 161–67 (2d 
ed. 2004). (Discussing arguably relevant incidents). 
 327 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 14) (DRC v. Belgium). 
 328 Id. at 20–22. 
 329 Genocide Case, 2007 I.C.J. at 286–88. 
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law.  In the Continental Shelf Case and later in Denmark v. Norway, 
the Court simply repeated its conclusions from the Gulf of Maine 
Case, ignoring extensive state practice supporting its result and 
again failing to explain why it did not rest its judgment on what 
presumably would have been the strongest available foundation. 
The Court stated in Nicaragua, Merits,330 with respect to CIL 
rules which states had violated, that: 
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible  with a 
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to 
exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, 
then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable 
on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm 
rather than to weaken the rule.331 
The Court simply asserted this conclusion without explaining 
the reasoning behind it.  In the same case, in a purported effort to 
determine whether there was opinio juris supporting the argument 
that the Charter’s use of force rules had become part of CIL, the 
Court treated the Declaration on Friendly Relations332 as evidence 
of that opinio juris, asserting that “[t]he effect of consent to the text 
of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a 
‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the treaty commitment undertaken in 
the Charter,” but “may be understood as an acceptance of the 
validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by 
themselves.”333  The Court did not explain why this should be so.  
It likewise did not explain its rationale for labeling as a 
demonstration of opinio juris for this principle the acceptance by 
the United States of non-binding resolutions at two international 
conferences and its ratification of a treaty.  Also in this case, the 
Court simply announced the standard it applied to determine 
whether the acts of the Nicaraguan contras could be attributed to 
the United States without explaining the derivation of this 
standard.  As described above,334 the ICJ dealt with a similar issue 
in the same way in the Genocide Case, supporting its conclusion 
 
 330 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27). 
 331 Id. at 98. 
 332 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 133. 
 333 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 99–100. 
 334 See supra text accompanying notes 191–94 (discussing in more detail the 
nature of the Genocide Case). 
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regarding attribution only by reference to another unexplained 
conclusion regarding the consequences of using a standard 
different from the one it had selected.  This latter point is 
particularly striking in light of the ICTY opinion to which the 
Court in the Genocide Case was responding; the ICTY’s opinion was 
carefully reasoned, while that of the ICJ rested simply on assertion. 
In the Oil Platforms Case, as noted above,335 the Court in effect 
asserted that 1) a state is the victim of an armed attack only if the 
attack is directed specifically at it; indiscriminate attacks do not 
count; 2) an armed action by the armed forces of one state against 
those of another is not necessarily an armed attack; whether it is 
depends on its gravity; 3) an action taken in self-defense cannot 
satisfy the necessity requirement unless it is preceded by a formal 
complaint by the ostensibly defending state, however pointless the 
making of such a complaint might be; and 4) the proportionality 
criterion in the law of self-defense is evaluated in terms of the 
harm already inflicted, not that to be avoided.  The Court provided 
no authority for any of these propositions, nor did it otherwise 
explain their derivation. 
In the Wall Case,336 the Court asserted, without explanation, that 
a state could not assert the right of self-defense to justify using 
force against a territory under Article 51 of the Charter if the 
danger against which the state wished to act was not created by 
another state,337 even though Article 51 sets out no such limitation.  
It took a similar position, with a similar lack of explanation, in DRC 
v. Uganda.338 
In addition to its failure to explain the basis for the rules it has 
applied, the Court, in some cases, has adopted methods of analysis 
inconsistent with those used in other cases, but has made no 
reference to the arguments it fails to address, an omission which 
has the effect of concealing the inconsistency.  Obviously, if the 
Court does not acknowledge a departure from previous analytical 
practice, it does not explain the legal rationale for the departure.  
This problem appears in LaGrand, with respect to both the 
American argument regarding the binding character of provisional 
 
 335  See supra text accompanying notes 155–65. 
 336 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) (Wall Case). 
 337 Id. at 194. 
 338 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Dec. 19. 2005, 45 I.L.M. 271 (DRC v. Uganda). 
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measures under Article 41,339 and the American argument as to the 
proper interpretation of Article 36 of the Consular Convention.340  
In both instances, the United States asserted an interpretation of a 
treaty based on the practice of the parties to the treaty with respect 
to the provision in question.  Despite its frequent holdings that 
such practice was to be considered in cases of treaty interpretation, 
the Court not only failed to consider the practice, but failed to 
acknowledge that the practice existed.  Similarly, in Avena, 
although the United States based its disagreement with the 
Mexican interpretation of Article 36 of the Consular Convention in 
part on the practice of the parties to that treaty, the Court did not 
even acknowledge that the argument had been made.341  Similarly, 
in the Diallo Case, the Court relied on the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection for some aspects of its judgment, but did not 
address the fact that the ILC had, in the commentaries to those 
articles, reached a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Court 
regarding another issue in the case.342  Further, in addressing that 
issue, the Court took note of arguments raised by Guinea, but 
failed to mention that one of the authorities upon which Guinea 
relied was the ILC.343 
Finally, in Nicaragua, Merits, it flatly misstated state practice.  It 
did this when it rationalized its refusal to put weight on states’ 
interventions in the internal affairs of other states in part by 
asserting that intervening states never offered legal justifications 
for their actions.344  In fact, as discussed above,345 in several notable 
instances, intervening states had made explicit both their beliefs 
 
 339 Compare Counter-Memorial of the United States, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 
2000 I.C.J. paras. 91, 138–65 (Mar. 27), with LaGrand, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 
499, 501–06 (June 27). 
 340 Compare Counter-Memorial of the United States., LaGrand, 2000 I.C.J. at 
para. 91, with LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 495–98. 
 341 Compare Counter-Memorial for the United States, Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Nov. 3), 89–98, paras. 6.32–6.43 
(Mar. 31), with Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
67–68 (Mar. 31). 
 342 Compare Diplomatic Protection Draft Articles, supra note 243, at 62–65, with 
Diallo Case (Guinea v. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 1, 29–31. 
 343 See Preliminary Objections, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. 
Congo) 46 I.L.M. 712 (Diallo Case). 
 344 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108–10 
(June 27). 
 345 See supra note 224 (explaining various states’ interventions in other 
countries and their justifications for intervening). 
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that their actions were justified and the legal arguments 
supporting those conclusions. 
 
3.2. Why We Should Care About the Court’s Approach 
3.2.1. Introduction 
We see then that, over the period in question, the Court has 
generally dealt with state practice in a fairly summary fashion; 
relied, as sources of legal rules, on entities whose legal authority is 
doubtful; frequently failed to explain the derivation of the rules 
upon which it relies; failed sometimes even to mention arguably 
plausible counter-arguments raised either by the parties or by 
authorities upon which the Court purported to rely and, once, 
flatly misstated the content of state practice. 
Beyond the foregoing observations, however, it is important to 
note two important implications of these patterns of behavior on 
the part of the Court.  First, it appears to be attempting to shift the 
authority to make international law from states to non-state 
international bodies.  States make law through their practice and 
through concluding and subsequently applying treaties.  If the 
Court gives little attention to state practice, and, in at least some 
cases, disregards clear indications of the parties’ understanding of 
otherwise ambiguous treaty language, the Court is effectively 
limiting the law-making role of states.  Conversely, it is necessarily 
magnifying the role of other international bodies if it ascribes 
binding legal effect to General Assembly resolutions, to the 
determinations of international conferences, to groups of experts in 
international law, and to its own earlier decisions. 
The second implication of the patterns of the Court’s behavior 
is that it seems to be moving away from what could be reasonably 
called a judicial role to that of a free-form policy maker.  One 
normally expects a tribunal to explain the reasoning from which it 
derives the legal rules it applies, but the ICJ has, as described, 
failed to do so on a number of occasions.  One also expects courts 
to provide guidance to the community by explaining the flaws in 
the legal arguments it rejects, which necessarily requires the court 
to note that the argument has been made.  To fail even to 
acknowledge that a party has made a particular argument makes it 
impossible for the parties and the international community 
generally to understand the legal basis for disregarding the 
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argument—and necessarily feeds the suspicion that the argument 
was ignored, not because it was incorrect, but because it was both 
correct and inconsistent with the result the Court wished to reach.  
Naturally, if the Court misstates the facts, these suspicions can only 
be reinforced. 
This section examines the difficulties these practices raise. 
3.2.2. Sources of law 
The question of the sources from which the Court draws what 
it labels rules of CIL can seem a drily technical one.  It is more than 
that.  CIL purports to govern the behavior of all states; treaties, 
however, govern only the behavior of treaty parties.  Therefore, 
authority to make CIL amounts to authority to control the actions 
of every state in the world.  Since states are the mechanisms 
through which their populations interact, controlling all states 
means controlling all people.  Explaining how it happens that this 
or that source of CIL may come to have so far-reaching an effect 
goes beyond mere technicality.  Rather, such an explanation is at 
the heart of political legitimacy. 
It is easy enough to justify reliance on state practice as a source 
of the CIL the Court applies.  In the first place, the Court is 
constrained to rely on state practice by its statute.  Beyond that 
point, states have a considerable claim to be speaking for their 
populations, and, to the extent that they do, it is simply an exercise 
of that authority when they create obligations for themselves that 
impact their populations.  Further, states are the institutions far 
and away best able to ensure that CIL rules actually govern 
international relations, since states have a great deal of control of 
the resources of their populations, and thus have a broad range of 
means for giving practical effect to their decisions. 
As discussed above, however, the Court in recent decades has, 
to a great extent, shifted its focus with respect to CIL away from 
states, looking instead to resolutions of the General Assembly, to 
actions by international conferences (as opposed to considering the 
legal effect of any treaties those conferences may produce), to 
determinations by expert bodies, and to its own decisions.  For the 
Court to treat such materials as sources of law raises a number of 
problems. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/1
2009] CONCEPT OF STATE PRACTICE 361 
 
In the first place, as Reisman has observed, Article 38 of the 
Statute of the Court  is a choice of law clause.346  Its terms are 
mandatory.  Even if it could somehow be argued that international 
law has seen the emergence of new sources of law since 1945, 
Article 38 represents the unequivocal determination of the states 
whose governments accepted the statute that the Court would be 
permitted to rely solely on the sources listed in Article 38 to 
produce the rules of law which it applies. 
This might seem like a mindlessly formalistic approach.  There 
are at least two arguments against that objection.  First, the basic 
question raised by any person or group purporting to exercise 
legal authority is, why should anyone feel obliged to pay any 
attention to what these people say?  Why are the judges of the 
Court anything more than fifteen people wearing robes?  The 
answer, surely, is that they are authorized to exercise the powers 
they exercise.  If, however, that is the answer, then to the extent 
that the judges seek to exercise powers beyond those authorized, 
they are simply fifteen people wearing robes.  And for the Court to 
apply sources of law not listed in Article 38 is for it to do just that 
and to go beyond its authority. 
The second argument against this stress on the language of 
Article 38 flows from an analogy to the federal courts in the United 
States.  At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, one concern 
about the establishment of a federal government was the fear that 
such a government must necessarily become a tyranny.  The 
federal courts’ rigid enforcement of limits on their jurisdiction 
reflected the triumph of the idea that, as the possessor of one 
aspect of federal power, it was as necessary for the courts as for the 
other branches of the federal government to respect the 
Constitution’s limits on that power.347  Any other approach, it was 
thought, would weaken the fabric of the country. 
The Court’s position is, if anything, more precarious than that 
of the federal courts in the early days of the United States.  Lacking 
either compulsory jurisdiction or, as a practical matter, any means 
 
 346 W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATIONS AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR (1992). 
 347 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003, 1033, 1111–13 (1985) (summarizing the political history behind the issue of 
defining the boundaries of federal common law); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal 
Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1241–42 (1985) (discussing 
development of a separation-of-powers principle that limits the jurisdiction of the 
federal court system in the United States). 
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of enforcing its judgments, its effectiveness depends entirely on the 
states’ willingness to accept those judgments.  For the Court to 
depart from the terms of the Statute which specify the sources it 
may treat as giving rise to law, therefore, is to risk defiance. 
The foregoing point addresses the extent of the Court’s 
discretion to look to sources of law other than those the Statute 
identifies, or to treat certain sources which the Statute designates 
as subsidiary means for the determination of law as though they 
were primary sources of law.  But even if the issue were the 
propriety of some institution not constrained by Article 38 to rely 
on the sources the Court has come to emphasize, one must still 
determine how it is that those sources can be considered law. 
The most basic question goes to formal authorization.  
Consider first the General Assembly.  According to the Charter of 
the United Nations, the General Assembly’s authority to take 
actions regarding matters other than the internal functioning of the 
organizations extends no further than the power to make 
recommendations, albeit regarding a broad variety of subjects.348  
As Professor Thirlway has observed: 
[T]he question of the effects of an Assembly resolution and 
that of the significance of the voting can become entangled 
in a sort of vicious circle:  as the representative of Russia 
reminded the Court [during the argument on the Nuclear 
Weapons Case]:  ‘Many States prefer rather to vote in favour 
of these resolutions or abstain from voting, than to vote 
against them, having precisely in mind that, according to 
the Charter, they do not create any legal norm and do not 
imply the recognition of any rules as such, but are only of 
recommendatory nature . . . .  The point is that, for each 
individual State participating in the voting, its vote is not 
directed to a particular dispute or situation affecting it, but 
is merely a general announcement of what it might contend 
if such a dispute or situation arose.  Furthermore, if it were 
an established principle that voting for a purportedly 
declaratory resolution constituted acceptance of the rule 
therein stated, then to vote in this way would have an 
immediate impact on the legal position of the voting State; 
but so long as there exists no such principle, the vote by 
 
 348 U.N. Charter arts. 10–14. 
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each State is legally insignificant because it is known (and 
intended) to be insignificant.349 
There is a further problem beyond that presented by the 
knowledge of states and their representatives that General 
Assembly resolutions have no legal effect—one of logic.  For 
example, in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court noted that 
“General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may 
sometimes have normative value.  They can, in certain 
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the 
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.”350  However, 
a vote for a resolution can indicate opinio juris only if it commits 
the voting state to the proposition that whatever rule the resolution 
asserts is legally binding.  But if the vote is non-binding, it is 
unclear how it can commit the state to anything. 
The Court’s effective ascription of formal authority to 
international conferences is at least as difficult to justify as its 
giving controlling weight to General Assembly resolutions.  Just as 
the U.N. Charter accords no legal effect to General Assembly 
resolutions, actions at conferences in themselves have no legal 
effect.  To be sure, a conference may produce a treaty; it may also 
demonstrate the existence of an apparent consensus on some 
subject which leads states to take specific actions regarding 
concrete issues.  However, until there is reason to see the actions of 
a conference as having affected some issue outside the conference 
hall, there seems to be no basis for ascribing any legal 
consequences to the mere fact that a conference met and, perhaps, 
took non-binding stands on this or that issue.  After all, states may 
find even a treaty produced by a conference unacceptable despite 
their representatives having agreed on a text.351 
 
 349 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960–1989, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 99–100 (2006) (quoting Verbatim Record, 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (Nov. 10, 1995), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/5964.pdf). 
 350 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 254–55 (July 8) (italics in original). 
 351 For example, even though the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International 
Organizations was adopted by the General Assembly in Decision 41/420, it has 
not yet become effective.  See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, http://treaties.un.org 
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The situation of expert bodies as sources of law is somewhat 
different from that of the General Assembly or of a conference.  As 
already noted, the work of bodies such as the ILC can fairly be 
considered subsidiary means for the determination of international 
law within the meaning of article 38(1)(d).  However, the Court 
cites the work of such bodies even when information on primary 
sources is available, for example, the ILC’s own reports on state 
practice regarding the subjects it addresses.  The implication is that 
the Court’s focus is not on the actions of states, but on the 
determinations of the body of experts.  This would seem justifiable 
only if the instruments establishing these bodies invest them with 
the power to make CIL.352  Those instruments contain no such 
provision.  For example, nothing in the Statute of the ILC gives it 
the authority to make law; it is authorized to propose actions to 
states, not to change the law by its own action.353 
Similarly, the Court’s reliance on its own decisions cannot be 
based on any grant of authority.  On the contrary, Article 59 of the 
Statute provides that the Court’s decisions have no binding force, 
except between the parties and with respect to the particular case.  
And Article 38(1)(d) makes explicit that the Court’s authority to 
treat judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law is subject to Article 59.354  Again, this is not to say 
that, when the Court has thoroughly examined a particular CIL 
issue in one case, it must always repeat the discussion in later cases 
even if nothing has happened since the first decision which could 
be thought to change the legal rule.  It is rather to say that, when 
the Court’s citation to an earlier case is anything more than a “see 
discussion at” reference, it appears to violate the express language 
of its Statute. 
Judge Shahabuddeen has attempted to defend the Court’s 
reliance on its own case law, but his arguments are flawed.  
 
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-3&chapter=23&lang 
=en (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
 352 See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
ninth Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, supra note 185, at paras. 76, 85–87, 134, available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_52_10.pdf (referencing 
the scope of authority of committees established to monitor compliance with 
human rights treaties). 
 353 See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. 
Doc. A/519, arts. 15–24, (Nov. 21, 1947) (refraining from granting the ICJ the 
authority to make law). 
 354 I.C.J. Statute, supra note 2, arts. 38(1)(d), 59. 
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Essentially, he argues that the Court’s treating its own decisions as 
sources of law is inherent in its nature as a permanently 
established court.355  Acknowledging that, with respect to domestic 
courts, the exercise of such power flows from the possession by 
those courts of some elements of the overall sovereignty of the 
state of whose government they form a part, he has asserted that 
the states of the world have delegated to the Court the authority to 
make law.356  The short answer to all these arguments is that, as the 
creators of the Court, the states forming it presumably could limit 
its powers as they chose, and that they have expressed those limits 
in the terms of the Statute.  The strict limits the Statute imposes on 
the Court’s powers cannot be reconciled with some notion that the 
Court was nonetheless intended to exercise the authority it has 
claimed.  Beyond these points, one element of Judge 
Shahabuddeen’s discussion appears to contradict his conclusion.  
He observes that “[n]ew cases sometimes influence the 
development of state practice.”357  But, if decisions only sometimes 
influence practice, it follows that, on other occasions, decisions do 
not influence practice.  If states ignore the Court’s decisions in their 
practice, it would appear that a subsidiary means for the 
determination of law, that is, the Court’s case law, is in conflict 
with a primary source of law, that is, state practice.  In such a case, 
for the Court to rely on an earlier decision in later cases, 
notwithstanding the states’ failure to conform their practice to that 
decision, would appear to give a subsidiary source of law priority 
over a primary source.  That result seems difficult to justify. 
To this point, this Section has argued that reliance on state 
practice as a source of CIL can be justified, both as required by the 
Statute and as consistent with the states’ capacity to represent their 
populations and their control of very significant resources.  In 
contrast, the Court’s treating General Assembly resolutions, the 
actions of conferences, determinations by expert bodies and its 
own decisions as sources of law is not consistent with its Statute 
and, further, accords such institutions power they are not granted 
by their founding instruments.  Beyond these points, however, 
there is another—why does it make sense to treat particular 
behaviors as sources of law?  In other words, according to what 
 
 355 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 40–41 (1996). 
 356 Id. at 93. 
 357 Id. at 209. 
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legal theory is it reasonable to treat institutions generating 
normative statements, i.e., statements of the form “X is forbidden,” 
“Y is optional,” “Z is mandatory,” as creating law as opposed to 
creating, for example, rules of games, or moral propositions, or 
political positions? 
This question is relatively easy to answer with respect to state 
practice as a generator of CIL.  First of all, aside from the Security 
Council, there are no international institutions authorized to 
impose binding rules on states.  Hence, there is no occasion to ask 
why practice-generated rules should be allowed to trump 
institution created rules.  Second, the International Law 
Association’s formulation is enlightening.  It will be recalled that 
the International Law Association has provided the following 
working definition of customary international law: 
 (i) Subject to the Sections which follow, a rule of 
customary international law is one which is created and 
sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States 
and other subjects of international law in or impinging 
upon their international legal relations, in circumstances 
which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar 
conduct in the future. 
(ii) If a sufficiently extensive and representative number of 
States participate in such a practice in a consistent manner, 
the resulting rule is one of “general customary international 
law.”  Subject to Section 15, such a rule is binding on all 
States.358  
This definition offers a plausible basis for attributing legal 
effect to state practice seen as legally binding, that is, that such 
practice creates expectations in other states.  It also provides a 
means for determining the legal effect of a given action, that is, by 
inquiring as to the extent to which the action create a legitimate 
expectation regarding future state behavior.  To be sure, implicit in 
that definition is the assumption of an unstated, basic principle—
that states ought not violate other states’ reasonable expectations.  
As with the rule pacta sunt servanda, one cannot explain the 
 
 358 COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L LAW, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2000), available at  http://www.ila               
-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376. 
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source of the obligation to apply this principle, though one can 
note that, just as with pacta sunt servanda, the rule is one which 
presumably seems a clear matter of common sense in most cultures 
in the world. 
When we turn to the non-practice based sources on which the 
Court has relied, however, there is no equivalent theory.  For 
example, if one asks why any legal effect should be attributed to a 
General Assembly resolution, one cannot respond that the General 
Assembly is authorized to create such effects, because that is not 
true.  One can imagine a case in which states intend that votes by 
their representatives would create legal effects, but there is no 
evidence that such a case has existed, and there is considerable 
reason to doubt that states have that intention in most cases.  This 
is not to say that it is impossible to generate a theory justifying the 
attribution of legal effect to General Assembly resolutions; it is 
only to say that it is not obvious what that theory would be, and 
that, in any case, the Court has certainly put forward no such 
theory to explain its reliance on formally non-binding sources. 
3.3.3. Analytical Technique 
Questions regarding the Court’s analytical technique arise from 
the extent to which it has arguably departed from what could be 
called “judicial” modes of behavior in its judgments.  In a few 
cases, there is reason to fear that some judges’ negative attitudes 
toward one of the litigants affected the resulting judgment,359 but 
ultimately, these questions are more fundamental than concerns 
about judicial bias. 
In the first place, courts are expected to explain their 
judgments.  Not only do such explanations provide guidance to 
those subject to the legal regime the Court is addressing, but they 
 
 359 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 314–
15 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (chastising former President of the Court, 
Elias, of giving an interview to the Associated Press during the pendency of the 
case in which he criticized the United States); id. at 179–80 (Elias, J., sep. opin.) 
(“Apart from the slants given to my alleged remarks, I confirm that the gist of 
what I am supposed to have said is quite correct and I very much regret the use 
made of it in a Member of the Court’s dissenting opinion to a Judgment which 
still confirms that the United States of America was found wrong by the Court 
even under a new President, on all the essential points made by Nicaragua against 
it.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 325 (Nov. 6) (Simma, J., sep. opin.) 
(explaining that he has assented to an opinion he largely disagrees with because 
he approves of the court’s actions in clearly delimiting the legal uses of force, 
which, he implies, is to scold the United States). 
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make clear that the Court’s determination is based on existing law, 
not on extraneous factors.  Yet, as I have noted at length, the ICJ 
not infrequently asserts the legal status of certain purported norms 
without explaining the derivation of those norms, in circumstances 
where the norm’s existence is not obvious.  Some writers have 
suggested that the collegial nature of the Court makes necessary 
relatively sketchy opinions, in light of the difficulty of obtaining 
agreement of a majority of judges on a thorough rationale.360  This 
may be an explanation, but it is not an excuse.  If the problem 
arises from the structure of the Court, then the implication is that 
the structure of the Court is defective, not that the problem does 
not exist. 
There are a number of examples of the difficulties that can be 
created by Delphic judicial opinions.  For example, as already 
discussed, the Court in Nicaragua stated that a state’s non-
compliance with a rule of CIL does not weaken the rule if the state 
seeks to characterize its behavior as in some way not violating the 
rule, even, apparently, if the characterization is in bad faith.361  This 
statement implies that the states’ descriptions of their practice are 
as important as the practice itself in determining the content of 
CIL.  This could not be true, however, if the rationale for ascribing 
law-making effect to state practice is that such practice creates 
reasonable expectations in other states that future practice will be 
consistent with current practice, since it would hardly be 
reasonable for one state to base its expectations regarding the 
behavior of a second state on descriptions the first state knew to be 
false.  Therefore, the Court must be assuming that there is some 
basis other than reasonable expectations for seeing practice as 
capable of creating law.  However, the Court never explains what 
this basis is.  Therefore, someone attempting to apply the Court’s 
theory to determine the content of CIL would be unable to do so, 
since there is no way to know the content of the theory. 
Even more troubling is the failure of the Court, in some cases, 
to acknowledge arguments, or elements of arguments, made by the 
litigants.  Among the principles of procedural fairness that seems 
universal is the idea that each litigant deserves a hearing—not 
simply an opportunity to present a case, but a right to have the 
 
 360 See, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 11, at 1545–46 (“[G]iven that a judgment is 
composed so as to reflect the common opinion of a majority of the judges, 
economy of expression in the collective collegiate pronouncement is inevitable.”). 
 361 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 98. 
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decision-maker listen to the case as made.  A corollary is that, if the 
decision-maker rules against a litigant, it is because the decision-
maker has concluded that the litigant’s case is without merit and, 
conversely, that the ruling would have been in the litigant’s favor if 
the decision-maker had determined his argument to be 
meritorious.  If, however, a decision-maker ignores plausible 
arguments made by a litigant, the decision-maker is failing to 
explain the flaws in those arguments.  Further, such a failure 
inevitably creates the suspicion that the decision-maker acts as it 
does because it cannot refute the arguments it ignores but does not 
choose to admit their correctness, since to do so would require a 
decision the opposite of that which it wishes to reach.  However, a 
decision that can be supported only by concealing the weakness of 
the legal arguments against it must derive from some non-legal 
considerations, not from the law—and a Court that decides cases 
based on factors other than the law hardly acts as a court of law.  
Of course, if this conclusion makes sense regarding a court’s failure 
to respond to arguments contrary to its ultimate conclusion, it 
makes even more sense regarding cases where the court bases its 
conclusions on a flat misstatement of legally relevant facts. 
These defects in the Court’s analyses undermine the rationale 
for judicial resolution of interstate disputes.  After all, the rationale 
for urging states to take their disagreements to courts is the 
assumption that, if the legal and factual elements of a dispute are 
considered by an unbiased body whose only objective is to identify 
and apply legal rules, the states affected by any resulting 
judgments will see themselves as having been treated justly and 
therefore be impelled to comply with the judges’ resolution of the 
problem.  Of course, there is obvious reason to wonder whether 
states want a just, as opposed to a favorable, outcome to a dispute.  
Even if one assumes that states want no more than justice, 
however, they are unlikely to see themselves as having been 
treated justly unless the international court to which they resort 
makes its reasoning transparent, addresses the arguments 
presented to it and refrains from misstating facts.  If it fails in any 
of these respects, a losing state must doubt the justice of the 
treatment it received.  And if legal institutions act unjustly while 
lacking the power to coerce, what sense does it make to rely on 
such institutions? 
4.  CONCLUSION 
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This article has sought to demonstrate that the ICJ’s approach 
to dealing with state practice, both as that practice pertains to CIL 
and as it is relevant to the interpretation of particular treaties, is 
seriously doubtful.  The question now is, what ought to be the 
response to this situation? 
In one sense, governments have already responded—only 65 
states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court,362 and two-
thirds of the members of the U.N., including four of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council do not accept that 
jurisdiction.  This relatively limited willingness to use the Court 
surely, in part, reflects doubts about the way it functions. 
But what about situations in which the case reaches the Court 
under some other heading of jurisdiction, but the Court reaches a 
clearly incorrect result due either to reliance on doubtful sources of 
law or to obvious flaws in its analysis?  Reisman has pointed out 
that, prior to the 20th century, the awards of international arbitral 
panels which exceeded their jurisdiction could be rejected by the 
states subject to the award on the grounds of excès de pouvoir,363 and 
has suggested that, in light of what he has characterized as the 
Court’s failure to adhere to the internal control mechanisms 
intended to limit its exercise of authority, its judgments could be 
ignored on analogous grounds.364 
This approach seems difficult to reconcile with Article 59 of the 
Statute, but may be the least bad alternative.  A government’s first 
responsibility is to its people, not to the Court.  If compliance with 
a judgment would impose significant costs on a state and the 
judgment was flagrantly incorrect, it would seem that compliance 
with a such a judgment would be difficult to defend—it would 
amount to the government treating its responsibilities to its 
population as less important than its undertaking to respect a 
judgment, the poor quality of which was itself evidence that 
neither the judgment nor the Court rendering it deserved respect. 
The flaws in the Court’s methods described in this Article 
ought to have consequences among commentators as well as 
among governments.  These consequences should take the form of 
avoiding attributing to the Court more authority than its Statute 
 
 362 See International Court of Justice, Report of the International Court of Justice 1 
August 2006–31 July 2007, U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. (No. 4) U.N. Doc. 
A/62/4 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
 363 REISMAN, supra note 346, at 11–12. 
 364 Id. at 41–45. 
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accords it or than its performance merits.  In books and articles too 
numerous to mention, commentators describe the Court’s view of 
the law as to a particular subject as “authoritative” or describe a 
disagreement over the content of the law as “settled” once the 
Court comes down on one side or the other of the disagreement.  
Nothing in the Statute purports to invest in the Court the authority 
to, in effect, determine the content of international law outside the 
context of a particular case.  Nor does the Court’s performance 
justify any assumption that its majorities are  knowledgeable 
enough, judicious enough, or disinterested enough to make it 
reasonable to base deference to it on the collective wisdom it has 
shown, whatever its formal authority. 
Many involved in international law will object to these 
suggestions.  In some cases this reaction may represent nothing 
more than support for the Court because of agreement with its 
results, however doubtful those results may be as matters of law.  
But it must be acknowledged that there will be disinterested 
arguments against this position as well.  How, it might be asked, 
can states be brought to respect international law if the principal 
court applying international law is treated with disrespect?  And if 
the Court’s judgments do not settle disputed doctrinal points, how 
can they be settled? 
The response is that states have shown their lack of regard for 
the Court through their unwillingness to rely on it.  A refusal to 
confront possible reasons for that reaction will not somehow 
induce states to alter their behavior.  Certainly, outside the area of 
maritime delimitation, it is difficult to identify a subject as to which 
the Court’s decisions appear to have influenced the behavior of 
states very much.  And while there is no denying the 
inconvenience presented by the lack of means for the international 
legal system to finally resolve doctrinal controversies, the 
convenience of having a means to resolve such disagreements does 
not and cannot somehow create the authority to do so improperly. 
Most fundamentally, according the Court more authority than 
can be reconciled with the language of the Statute and the quality 
of its performance presents a danger to international law.  If there 
are serious questions about the functioning of a tribunal 
purporting to apply international law, there is a risk that the 
problem will be thought to lie, not in the court, but in the body of 
law in question.  Reasons to avoid the Court can thus become 
reasons to ignore the law.  Further, the Court can defend itself in 
such circumstances only by arguing that its results are correct—
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that is, that the flawed rules the Court has applied really are the 
law.  If that approach is taken, however, it can only strengthen 
arguments that the law “is a ass”—and the consequences that 
would follow seem obvious. 
The current situation is one in which states pay little attention 
to the Court, which in turn means that it can have little effect on 
international law as it plays out in the world beyond the academy.  
Surely, the world would be better off it there was an international 
court to which states paid attention, even if the price of that 
attention was the Court’s limiting its role to applying the rules that 
states have authorized it to apply. 
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